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1Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters which were written independently. Each chapter
answers different questions. But they share a single target: improving the ability
of flexible price models in explaining volatile asset price movements. Standard real
business cycle models have difficulties in matching asset price volatilities observed in
the data.1 In the literature, usually this problem is solved by introducing the sticky
price assumption. This thesis attempts to produce higher asset price volatilities with
flexible price models by introducing frictions in the money and credit markets.
This thesis has two original contributions. The second chapter, “segmented money
market, credit constraint and asset prices”, is the first in the literature to integrate a
segmented market with a credit constraint into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model within a flexible price framework. It provides a competing model to explain high
asset price volatilities against the popular sticky price models.
The third chapter, “macroeconomic effects of leverage cycles”, is the first in the lit-
erature to endogenize the loan-to-value ratio of a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.2 An endogenous loan-to-value ratio
not only produces more volatile asset price movements, it also explains the pro-cyclical
1See Rouwenhorst (1995) for a more detailed discussion on this feature.
2The Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint is an ad hoc assumption on the ability of borrowers to
finance for their expenditures. It states that borrowers can at most borrow a fraction of the present
value of collateral assets. For example, assume that borrowers use their housing asset Ht+1 as collateral,
their borrowing amount Bt+1 should satisfy Bt+1 ≤ θEt
[
Pht+1Ht+1
Rt+1
]
, where Pht+1 and Rt+1 are housing
price and discounting interest rate at time t+ 1 respectively. θ is the fixed loan-to-value ratio.
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movements of loan-to-value ratios in the real world.3
Flexible price models have two difficulties in producing significant responses of asset
prices to monetary shocks. The combination of segmented market with credit constraint
in the second chapter solves the two difficulties simultaneously. The first difficulty is
that, in flexible price models (like standard cash-in-advance models), monetary shocks
tend to have negative effects on production due to the inflation tax. As a result, asset
prices fluctuations are mild in response to monetary shocks. A mechanism needs to
be introduced so that production increases in response to positive monetary shocks
without resorting to the sticky price assumption. The second difficulty is that, even a
mechanism as described above had been discovered, considering the fact that the money
injection quantity is negligible compared to the national wealth, it is not convincing
that such minor disturbances are capable to produce significant real effects in a stable
macroeconomic environment, in which monetary shocks are small.
The idea of uneven money injections, as proposed by Friedman (1968) and the Aus-
trian school economists like Hayek (1969), can solve the first problem. The segmented
market models, like Christiano & Eichenbaum (1995), have rigorously included this idea
into mainstream macroeconomic models. Due to market segmentations, the agents in
the economy receive heterogeneous amount of money injections. Relative prices of com-
modities preferred by those who receive more money injections will be pushed up due
to higher demand, which incurs more production of these commodities. If, and it is
a quite realistic assumption, producers (entrepreneurs) receive more money injections,
since they prefer to buy capital goods, the prices of capital goods (asset prices) will be
pushed up and the accumulation of capital will be increased following the same logic.
With more capital available, production in this economy increases. On the contrary, in
standard cash in advance models which assume helicopter drop of new issued money,
agents receive the same amount of money injections. As a result, monetary policy can
only affect the general price level, which reduces production through inflation tax.
However, as suggested by Edmond & Weill (2008), segmented market models are
unlikely to produce quantitatively significant effects within reasonable market segmen-
tations. Therefore, it is not surprising that segmented market models turn to the sticky
3In the literature, the loan-to-value ratio is treated as a constant or an exogenous shock process.
But in the real world, loan-to-value ratios are endogenous (determined by banks) and pro-cyclical. See
the introduction part in chapter 3 for detail.
2
price assumption for help. For example, the influential paper by Christiano, Eichen-
baum and Evans (2005) integrates sticky price with segmented market in a unified
model.
The second difficulty is actually about an amplifying mechanism, which propagates,
amplifies and prolongs the initial real effects caused by monetary shocks. And since
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), it is well understood that credit constraints are capable to
amplify the effects of initial shocks. The amplifying effects incurred by credit constraints
are referred to as financial accelerator in the literature.
Combining segmented market with credit constraint can solve the two difficulties
simultaneously. Uneven money injections caused by market segmentations lead to
higher asset prices if producers receive more money. The raised asset prices relax the
credit constraints, which triggers the financial accelerator mechanism. The financial
accelerator then propagates, amplifies and prolongs the initial real effects caused by
monetary shocks. This combination provides a competing model in explaining the
volatile asset price behaviors within a flexible price framework against the popular
sticky price models.
Sticky price models are popular, especially among policy makers. However, the
sticky price assumption does not have a solid micro foundation (Williamson (2010)).
There are other convincing explanations for the observed sticky price phenomena.4
In addition, in developing countries, general prices (including wages) are usually much
more flexible than in developed countries. Therefore, it is necessary to develop compet-
ing flexible price models against the popular sticky price models in explaining volatile
asset price movements. There are at least three economic meanings. First, flexible
price models have very different policy implications. Since flexible price models are
well micro-founded, theoretically, their policy suggestions should be preferred if they
can offer competing explanations of volatile asset price movements. Second, in practice,
if flexible price models are also capable to explain volatile asset price movements, pol-
icy makers should ponder which policy to take rather than just follow the suggestions
of sticky price models. Finally, in developing countries, flexible price models which
4For observed evidences of sticky prices, see Taylor (1999) and Klenow Malin (2010) for compre-
hensive surveys. Alchian (1969) and Barzel (1997) convincingly argue that transaction costs could lead
to equilibrium sticky prices (the sticky price assumption assumes market disequilibrium.). Alchian and
Allen (1974) further suggests that transaction prices are much more flexible than menu prices.
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are capable to explain volatile asset price movements should be considered first when
examining the effects of monetary policy.
In chapter 3, the endogenized loan-to-value ratio of a Kiyotaki-Moore credit con-
straint provides another mechanism which improves the ability of flexible price models
in explaining volatile asset price movements.
In chapter 3, entrepreneurs are assumed to face undiversifiable idiosyncratic shocks
in addition to aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. If the realized id-
iosyncratic shock is too low, some firms (borrowers) are unable to pay back the money
loaned by banks and become bankrupt. Banks have to auction the collateral capital to
get some money back. A bankruptcy cost is assumed so that banks can only receive a
fraction of the market value of the collateral asset. When there is a positive productiv-
ity shock, the default probability decreases, it is profitable to lend more therefore the
loan-to-value ratio is increased. On the other hand, more lending puts more asset at
risks, which tends to increase the default probability. The reason is that more available
funds for entrepreneurs lead to more investment. More investment reduces the return
to capital (law of diminishing marginal return), which increases the default chances.
The conflicting effects of increased loan-to-value ratio imply there is an optimal loan-
to-value ratio such that new investment opportunity is fully exploited and the expected
return of banks is maximized.
The endogenous loan-to-value ratio amplifies the financial accelerator effects of a
credit constraint. With a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint, a positive TFP shock
increases the demand for asset, which pushes up the asset price. The increased market
value of collateral asset relaxes the credit constraint, inducing more borrowing as well
as more demand for asset, a reinforcing cycle begins and is referred to as financial
accelerator. With an endogenous loan-to-value ratio, in response to a positive TFP
shock, the optimal loan-to-value ratio is increased as well, which relaxes the credit
constraint further. The increased loan-to-value ratio serves as an extra push within each
reinforcing cycle. That is, the optimization behavior of banks amplifies the financial
accelerator effects.
Chapter 4 extends the model developed in chapter 3 to include the real estates, the
most often used collateral asset in the real world. The extended model aims to explain
the effects of an endogenous loan-to-value ratio on housing price behaviors. It shows
4
that the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model is able to produce much larger housing
price volatilities than an exogenous loan-to-value ratio model.
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2Segmented Money Market,
Credit Constraint and Asset
Prices 1
2.1 Introduction
The Great Moderation has challenged the quantitative flexible price models seriously
with one economic phenomenon as summarized by the IMF (2000, p77) that “pro-
longed built-ups and sharp collapses in asset markets have taken place amidst a decline
in consumer price inflation and a more stable macroeconomic environment in most of
the industrialized world”. Standard quantitative monetary flexible price models (like
standard cash-in-advance models) have difficulties in producing large asset price move-
ments with small monetary disturbances.
The first difficulty is that, in standard cash-in-advance models, monetary shocks
tend to have negative effects on production and asset prices due to the inflation tax.
A mechanism needs to be found so that monetary shocks can have positive effects on
production without resorting to the sticky price assumption. The second difficulty is
that, even a mechanism had been discovered, considering the reality that money injec-
tion quantities are negligible compared to the national wealth, it is not convincing that
1I have benefitted greatly from the suggestions and comments of Timothy Kam, Pedro Gomis-
Porqueras, Timo Henckel, Junsang Lee, Vipin Arora, Chris Edmond and Craig Burnside. I also received
very helpful comments in seminar presentations at The Australian National University and the 2011
PhD conference at Queensland University.
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such minor disturbances can produce significant real effects in a stable macroeconomic
environment.
The idea of uneven money injections proposed by Friedman (1968) and the Aus-
trian school economists like Hayek (1969) can solve the first problem. The segmented
market models, like Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), include this idea in rigorous
mainstream macro models. However, as suggested by Edmond and Weill (2008) in
their survey paper, segmented market models are unlikely to produce quantitatively
significant effects within reasonable market segmentations. Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that segmented market models turn to the sticky price assumption for help. For
example, the influential paper by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) includes
the segmented market into a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model.
The second difficulty is actually about an amplifying mechanism, which propagates,
prolongs and amplifies the real effects caused by monetary shocks. Ever since Fisher
(1933), the amplification mechanism caused by financial market frictions is well un-
derstood by economists. However, it is Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) who first include this mechanism into rigorous macroeconomic mod-
els. Financial market frictions have been introduced into the sticky price models in
no time. The financial accelerator in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) is introduced into
a sticky price model by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The Kiyotaki-Moore
style credit constraint is introduced into a sticky price model by Iacoviello (2005) too.
Their simulations show that with the help of sticky prices, volatile asset price behaviors
can be largely explained.
There are attempts within the framework of flexible price models too. Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004) introduce a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint into a standard cash-
in-advance model (essentially the third benchmark model in this chapter). Gust and
Lopez-Salido (2011) introduce endogenous segmented markets into a standard cash-in-
advance model (essentially the second benchmark model in this chapter). Andolfatto
and Williamson (2015) introduce endogenous segmented markets into a third-generation
money search model. However, all these attempts are insufficient to solve the two
difficulties described above simultaneously.
This chapter integrates segmented market (money is injected unevenly due to mar-
ket segmentations) with credit constraint into an otherwise standard cash-in-advance
8
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model to solve the two difficulties simultaneously. The model developed in this chapter
is based on Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) and Iacoviello (2005). The mechanism
of the model developed in this chapter can be summarized in the diagram below:
M↑ ⇒ i↓ =⇒ I↑ =⇒ q↑ =⇒ B↑ =⇒ I↑ =⇒ q↑ · ··
A positive monetary policy increases the supply of loanable fund, therefore lowers the
interest rate. Due to money market segmentations, only entrepreneurs have access
to money markets. With lower financing cost, entrepreneurs invest more on capital
accumulations. The higher demand of capital pushes up the price of capital, which also
serves as collateral for loans. Higher asset price relaxes the credit constraint, and leads
to even more borrowing and investment. The financial accelerator starts to function
and amplifies the initial effects of monetary shocks. It is therefore possible to produce
large asset price movements within a flexible price model.
The simulations show that the combination of segmented market and credit con-
straint is quite successful. It produces much larger asset price movements in response
to small monetary shocks than a standard cash-in-advance model or a model with only
credit constraint or segmented market.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follow: the second section gives a literature
review on uneven money injection and models with credit market frictions. Section
three presents the main model. Section four reports the simulation results. The last
section summarizes this chapter.
2.2 Literature Review
In this section, I give a highly selective literature review on uneven money injection
and credit constraint. The idea of uneven money injection dates back to as early as
Hume (1752) and is first developed as a rigorous segmented market model by Lucas
(1990). For a comprehensive survey on segmented market models, see Edmond & Weill
(2008). The idea that credit market frictions lead to self-reinforcing cycles dates back
to Fisher (1933) and is first developed as rigorous macroeconomic models by Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). For a comprehensive survey on
models of financial market frictions, see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov (2012).
9
2. SEGMENTED MONEY MARKET, CREDIT CONSTRAINT AND
ASSET PRICES
2.2.1 Uneven Money Injection
In standard real business cycle models with money, money injection is assumed to be of
helicopter drop and therefore even. Even money injections only lead to the increase of
general price levels and have no real effects. On the other hand, uneven money injections
disturb the relative prices and therefore have real effects. Friedman (1994, Chapter 2)
gives a vivid example on how uneven money injections cause relative prices to change.
In the gold rush era in Melbourne, the prices of luxurious goods increased dramatically
as gold miners, the receivers of injected money (gold), preferred an extravagant life.
The relative price between consumption good and capital good could be altered
by uneven money injections too. In a segmented money market, if only entrepreneurs
have the access to money injections, and since entrepreneurs prefer to buy capital good,
money injections will cause the relative price of capital good compared to consumption
commodity to increase. The increased price will induce more production of capital
goods. This increases the future capital stock. With more capital available, production
will be increased. A modified quantity equation of money, MV = P1C+P2I, is helpful
to explain the mechanism described above. When entrepreneurs receive more of the
new issued money than consumers, the nominal price of capital good P2 increases faster
than the nominal price of consumption good P1. As a result, capital good becomes more
expensive relative. A higher price of capital leads to more production of capital good.
Money injections therefore have real effects.
It is well recognized that Hume (1752) first stated the idea of the quantity theory
of money in his influential essay Of Money. His argument that the increase of money
supply eventually (that is, in the long-run) only leads to the increase of nominal prices
is well verified. However, in that essay, Hume also elucidates two channels through
which money injections have real effects. The first channel is unexpected money injec-
tions, and this channel is well explored by Lucas (1996). The second channel is uneven
money injections. In his essay Of Money, Hume argues that“when any quantity of
money is imported into a nation, it is not at first dispersed into many hands but is
confined to the coffers of a few persons, who immediately seek to employ it to advan-
tage. [p38]” Then he discusses the effects of uneven money injections in a simplified
economy in which manufacturers first receive new-injected money. With more money,
manufacturers employ more workers and the production is increased for a while.
10
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The second channel had been generally ignored in the literature for a long time. It is
the Austrian school (for example, Hayek(1969))that first gives a central role to uneven
money injections in the business cycle theory. As surveyed by Garrison (2005), the
Austrian school argues that uneven money injections increase the supply of loanable
fund, which lowers the interest rate. Since the financing cost is reduced, investment
increases.2
Friedman (1968) re-states the idea of uneven money injections under the background
of modern monetary system. Friedman argues that money injections are conducted in
money markets, and only those investors with access to money markets can receive new
issued money. Money injections have two opposite effects: liquidity effects and Fisher
effects. Liquidity effects tend to reduce the nominal interest rate as more loanable
fund is available with money injections. Fisher effects tend to increase nominal interest
rate as inflation is expected to increase. Due to market segmentations, money cannot
be dispersed to everyone in the economy in the short run, therefore, liquidity effects
dominate Fisher effects, and the nominal as well as real interest rate is decreased. But
in the long run, Fisher effects dominate, and only the nominal interest rate is increased.
In a sense, the argument of Friedman gives a micro-foundation for the uneven money
injection theory of the Austrian school.
Lucas (1990) is the first to develop a rigorous model of liquidity effects. In his model,
only firms receive money injections. Firms face a cash in advance (CIA) constraint on
paying their wage bills. Money injections relax their CIA constraints, leading to higher
labor hiring and production. The novelty of the Lucas model is the large family trick
which solves the tractability problem of heterogenous money holdings. It is assumed
that at the end of each period, entrepreneurs and households merge as a large family,
then money holdings become homogenous to each agent. Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1995) develop a delicate model based on Lucas (1990) to handle the tractability prob-
lem more easily without explicitly using the large family trick. The main model of
this paper is based on Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) to introduce uneven money
injections.
2There is no standard version of Austrian business cycle model. Here is just one of them, and
hopefully the most accepted one. It could be interpreted in another perspective: if only the investors
had the access to new money injections, money injections transfer wealth to investors from savors.
Then the richer investors will choose to invest more.
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Another approach to model the liquidity effects is to employ the “inventory-theoretic”
analysis, which can be seen as a modern version of the Bamoul and Tobin’s money in-
ventory models. This approach is also called as “endogenous segmented market models”
in the literature. For a comprehensive survey, see Edmond and Weill (2008).
2.2.2 Credit Constraint
The idea that credit market frictions can lead to self-reinforcing cycles (financial accel-
erator) can be traced back to Fisher (1933). In modern macroeconomic literature, there
are mainly two approaches to model financial market frictions. The first one is costly
external finance (costly state verification) approach. This approach is first developed by
Bernanke and Gertler (BG, 1989). The second approach is limited enforcement. With
this approach, a credit constraint which requires assets pledged as collateral guarantees
the enforcement of a credit contract. Kiyotaki and Moore (KM, 1997) first develop a
rigorous credit constraint model.
The original BG model is a real over-lapping generation model. Charstrom and
Fuerst (1997) introduce the costly external finance mechanism into a computable dy-
namic general equilibrium model. Then Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG, 1999)
extend the model of Charstrom and Fuerst (1997) to include money and sticky prices.
The BGG model have become the canonical model of the first approach, and there
are a lot of extensions based on the BGG model in the literature. See Brunnermeier,
Eisenbach and Sannikov (2012) for a comprehensive survey.
Like the BG model, the KM model is a simple real model without money. Iacoviello
(2005) introduces a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint into a sticky price dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model. The main model in this chapter is based on
Iacoviello (2005) to model the credit constraint. Following important developments
include Liu, Wang and Zha (2009, 2013), Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2011)
e.t.c.. See the introduction section of chapter 3 for more literature on credit constraint.
The two approaches have different modelling strategies. The costly external finance
approach is more micro-founded because in costly external finance models, the financial
contract is optimally determined by financial intermediaries, but in the limited enforce-
ment models, credit constraint is just an ad hoc assumption. However, despite all these
differences, it should be stressed that the main mechanism of the two approaches are
almost the same. They are usually referred to as financial accelerator models.
12
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The modelling strategy differences between these two approaches are similar to that
of the two modelling strategies in econometrics. The costly external finance approach is
like the structural form model, while the credit constraint approach is like the reduced
form model. There are no absolute advantages for either approach. Rather, it is the
research targets determine which approach should be used. For the purpose of this
chapter, I adopt the credit constraint approach.
2.3 The Model
There are three types of agents in the model: households, financial intermediaries
and entrepreneurs. Households are endowed with labor, entrepreneurs are endowed
with capital and possess the technology to produce final products and capital goods.
Financial intermediaries are owned by households and are the only channel through
which to inject money.
Households Entrepreneurs
Financial 
Intermediaries
Short-term 
Savings
Labor 
Earnings
Monetary 
Authority
Money Injection
Households
Financial 
Intermediaries
Consumption 
Purchases
Entrepreneurs
Short-term 
Loan + interest
t t+1
Short-term 
Loans Short-term Saving + 
interest
Figure 1. The Cash flow Chart.
Left, 1A, Cash flow at the beginning of each period;
Right, 1B, cash flow at the end of each period.
At the beginning of time t, households allocate their money holdings between the
cash reserve for consumption goods Ct and short term savings to financial intermedi-
aries Nt. Financial intermediaries collect the short time savings from households and
accept new money injections gtMt (here Mt is the money stock, gt is the money growth
rate) from the central bank. Financial intermediaries then lend the money collected
from households and injected by the central bank to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are
13
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assumed to face cash-in-advance constraint for wage bills (working capital). They bor-
rows cash from financial intermediaries to pay for their wage bills to households, as
shown in Figure 1A.
With the short term cash loan from financial intermediaries, entrepreneurs employ
labor from households and combine labor with capital to produce the final products.
Then households use the reserved money to buy consumption good from entrepreneurs.
With this income, entrepreneurs pay back the loans with interest to financial interme-
diaries. Then financial intermediaries pay back households their short term saving with
interests. The above processes are shown in figure 1B.
1. The aggregate productivity shock (zt) is realized.
2. Households decide how much to save (Nt) to financial intermediaries and
how much of their labor to supply.
3. New money (gtMt) is issued to financial intermediaries by the central bank.
4. Financial intermediaries lend (Nt + gtMt) to entrepreneurs.
5. Entrepreneurs decide the quantity of labor (Ht) to hire from household and
production is conducted.
6. households buy consumption good (Ct) from entrepreneurs with reserved money (Mt −Nt) .
7. With income from selling products, entrepreneurs pay back (Nt + gtMt) R
e
t
to financial intermediaries.
8. Financial intermediaries pay back NtR
n
t to households.
9. Entrepreneurs borrow Bt+1 from households and pay BtRt to households through
financial intermediaries.
Table 1. The sequence of events in a given period t
At the end of period t, both households and entrepreneurs make their decisions
for investment. Since it is assumed that only entrepreneurs have access to investment
technology, households would like to lend their leftover of income to entrepreneurs. It is
assumed that due to financial frictions, households make their lending to entrepreneurs
through financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries collect long-term savings
Lt+1 from households, then lends long-term loan Bt+1 to entrepreneurs. The long-term
loan is much more risky than the short-term cash loan, for safety reasons (costly en-
forcement), financial intermediaries require entrepreneurs pledge capital as collateral for
long-term loans. With new long-term borrowing from financial intermediaries and prof-
its, entrepreneurs pay back last period long term loan plus interests RtBt to financial
intermediaries and make decisions new investment It. Finally, financial intermediaries
pay back last period long-term saving plus interests to households.
14
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The timing of this model is summarized in Table 1.
At any period, a representative bank has two types of liabilities and assets, as
shown in figure 2. However, financial intermediaries in this model are very simple
and not micro-founded. Rather, they are more like a modelling strategy to introduce
segmented markets and credit constraints. In addition, the short term liability and
asset of a representative bank is in cash, and its long term liability and asset is in
credit (commodity).
LiabilitiesAssets
Short-term Savings
Long-term Savings
Short-term Loans
Long-term Loans
Figure 2. The Balance sheet of a representative bank
The details of the model is presented bellow. Since the choices of households are
standard, I will start with the household’s problem.
2.3.1 Households
The population of households are normalized to be of measure 1. Each household owns
one unit of labor, and tries to maximize the lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct, 1−Ht) (2.1)
while faces a cash-in-advance constraint and a flow budget constraint:
PtCt +Nt = Mt (2.2)
PtwtHt +R
n
t Nt + LtRt = [Mt − PtCt −Nt] + Lt+1 +Mt+1 (2.3)
15
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where E0 is the expectation operator at time zero, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Ct
is the consumption at t. Ht is the labor supply with wage real wt, and (1−Ht) is the
leisure. The nominal price at t is Pt. Nt is the short term saving described above, and
part of household’s money holding; Lt is the nominal long term savings. R
n
t and Rt
are the nominal gross returns paid by financial intermediaries. Note in equation (2.3),
Rt and R
n
t are different, Rt is determined in period t − 1, while Rnt is determined at
period t.
To normalize the nominal variables, denote mt =
Mt
Pt−1
as the real money balance
at period t, nt =
Nt
Pt
as the real saving, and Πt =
Pt+1
Pt
as the gross inflation rate.
The households choose consumption Ct, labor supply Ht, short-term saving Nt,
long-term saving Lt+1 as well as money holding Mt+1 to maximize their utility. The
first order conditions are reported in Appendix A, where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier
for households’ income.
2.3.2 Entrepreneurs
The population of entrepreneurs are normalized to be of measure 1 too. Entrepreneurs
own capital and make the decisions of investment and labor hiring to maximize their
lifetime utility over consumption Cet :
E0
∞∑
t=0
γtU (Cet ) (2.4)
where 0 < γ < β < 1, i.e., entrepreneurs are less patient than households. This
assumption is to make sure that the credit constraint (2.9) binding around the steady
state.
Entrepreneurs face five constraints: the technology to produce the capital, the
technology to produce the final products, a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint with
capital as collateral and a cash-in-advance constraint to finance for working capital,
and finally, a flow-budget constraint.
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (2.5)
It = Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt (2.6)
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Yt = ztF (Kt, Ht) (2.7)
PtwtHt = M
e
t (2.8)
bt+1 ≤ θEt [qt+1Kt+1Πt+1/Rt+1] (2.9)
Yt + bt+1 = C
e
t + qtIt + [wtht − bnt ] +metRet +Rt
bt
Πt
(2.10)
where Kt is the capital stock at time t, It is the investment, δ is depreciation rate of
capital. Yt is the production at t, and ztF (Kt, Ht) is the production function, which
uses capital and labor as inputs to produce the final products, and faces a productivity
shock zt. bt =
Bt
Pt−1
is the real long-term loan from financial intermediaries, and
met =
M et
Pt
is the real short term loan from financial intermediaries. qt is the real
price of capital good, or the “Tobin’s Q”. Ret is the gross nominal interest rate paid to
financial intermediaries, while Rt is the gross interest rate paid to households.
Equation (2.7) is the standard dynamic equation of capital; equation (2.7) is the
production function; equation (2.10) is the flow budget constraint for entrepreneurs.
Equation (2.6) is the adjustment cost for investment. It pins down the price of
capital qt. Equation (2.8) is the cash-in-advance constraint for entrepreneurs, where
M et is the money borrowed from financial intermediaries to finance for working capital
(the nominal wage bill). Equation (2.9) is the credit constraint for long-term borrow-
ing. It says that the long term borrowing requires capital pledged as collateral and
entrepreneurs can at most borrow a fraction (0 < θ < 1) of the present value of the
collateral asset.
Since M et is to pay for the wage bills, It is obvious from the flow budget constraint
(equation (2.10)) that the long term borrowing bt+1 is used to finance for capital. The
short-term borrowing M et is paid back at the end of period t, therefore its interest rate
Rnt is determined at period t. The long-term borrowing bt is loaned at time t− 1 and
paid back at period t, therefore its interest rate Rt is determined at time t− 1.
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2.3.3 Financial Intermediaries
As described at the beginning of this section, financial intermediaries have two types of
liabilities and assets. For short term cash loan to entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries
have two sources of funding: the short term cash savings Nt from households and new
money injections gtMt. For long term commodity (credit) loans to entrepreneurs, finan-
cial intermediaries have only one funding source: the long-term savings from Lt+1 from
households. Financial intermediaries are in a complete competitive market therefore
make zero profit:
RetM
e
t = R
n
t Nt (2.11)
Rt+1Lt+1 = Rt+1Bt+1 (2.12)
In equilibrium we have:
M et = (Nt + gtMt) (2.13)
where gt is the money growth rate and controlled by the monetary authority. The
monetary policy in this model is too simple to be alike how monetary policy is conducted
in the real world. However, Christiano & Eichenbaum (1995) show that this simple way
is equivalent to conducting monetary policy by trading government bonds. Adding
the government bond trading only complicates the computations. Equation (2.13) says
that in equilibrium, the money borrowed by entrepreneurs from financial intermediaries
should equal to the saving from households Nt plus the new injected money. Monetary
shock gt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
ln (gt+1) = ρg ln (gt) + ε
g
t+1 (2.14)
where 0 < ρg < 1 is the persistent parameter, ε
g
t+1 is the i.i.d shock with zero mean.
It is obvious from equations (2.11) and (2.13) that an increase of money supply
would lead to an decrease of the short term loan interest rate Ret . Since only en-
trepreneurs get the access to the money market, the lowered short term loan interest
rate only benefits entrepreneurs.
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2.3.4 Equilibrium
Suppose U(Ct, Ht) = ln (Ct)+ξ ln (1−Ht) , U (Cet ) = ln (Cet ) , ztF (Kt, Ht) = ztKαt H1−αt ,
and It subjected to an adjustment cost
χ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt. zt is the exogenous productivity
shock and follows a AR(1) process:
ln (zt+1) = ρz ln (zt) + ε
z
t+1 (2.15)
where 0 < ρz < 1 is the persistent parameter, ε
z
t+1 is the i.i.d shock with zero mean.
The we can derive all the first order conditions as reported in Appendix A.
In a competitive equilibrium, the markets for goods, labor, credits all clear. The
goods market clearing condition is:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + qtIt (2.16)
The market clearing condition for short term loan market is:
M et = (Nt + gtMt) (2.17)
The market clearing condition for short term loan market is:
Lt+1 = Bt+1 (2.18)
A competitive equilibrium then can be defined as sequences of prices {Wt, qt, Rt, Ret , Rnt }∞t=0
and sequences of allocations {Yt, Ct, Cet , It, , Lt, Ht, Nt, Bt,Kt,Mt,Πt}∞t=0 such that (i)
taking prices as given, the allocations solve the optimizing problems for households and
entrepreneurs, and (ii) all markets clear. A full characterization of the equilibrium is
presented in Appendix A.
The steady state values are presented in appendix B. Let hatted variables denote
percentage changes from the steady state, and those without time subscript denote
steady state values. Then the model can be reduced to a linearized system, as reported
in Appendix C.
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2.4 Parameterizations and Simulations
The parameter values are calibrated use the US quarterly data, and reported in table
2. β is calibrated so that the risk free interest rate is 1%. Consistent with Iacoviello
(2005), γ is set as 0.96. ξ is calibrated so that the steady state value of labor (H) is
1/3. α is calibrated so that it equals to the proportion capital income accounts for in
GDP. The depreciation ratio δ is set as 0.0025, which is traditional in the literature.
The marginal adjustment cost χ is estimated by Christensen & Dib (2008) as 0.58.
The persistent parameters ρz and ρg are set as 0.95. The steady state gross inflation
rate Π is set is 1.01, equivalent to 4% annual inflation. These parameter values are
conventional in standard real business cycle models. Mendoza (2006) estimates that
the loan-to-value ratio θ ranges from 0.14-0.4 with an average at around 0.3. Therefore
in this chapter and the next two chapters, θ is set as 0.3. The simulation results in this
chapter is robust for 0 < θ < 1.
parameter notation value
households’ discount factor β 0.99
entrepreneurs’ discount factor γ 0.96
credit constraint θ 0.3
Gross Inflation(Steady State) Π 1.01
marginal adjustment cost χ 0.58
depreciation rate δ 0.025
autocorrelation of shocks ρz 0.95
autocorrelation of shocks ρg 0.95
Table 2. Parameter Values
To understand the effects of the combination of segmented market and credit con-
straint, three benchmark models are developed for comparisons. The first benchmark
model is a standard real business cycle model with a cash-in-advance constraint for
consumption and an adjustment cost for capital accumulation. The second benchmark
model has uneven money injection (segmented market) but no credit constraint. The
third benchmark model faces binding credit constraint but money is injected evenly.3
3Mathematically, the first benchmark model does not have the credit constraint equation (2.9), the
zero-profit condition (2.13) for financial intermediaries is simply Nt = M
e
t , and the CIA constraint
for households (2.2) is Ct + Nt = Mt + Tt, where Tt = gtMt is the money injection. The second
benchmark model does not have the credit constraint equation (2.9). The third benchmark model has
the credit constraint equation (2.9), but its zero-profit condition equation and CIA constraint equation
for households are the same with benchmark model 1.
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data MM(% of data) BM1(% of data) BM2(% of data) BM3(% of data)
(Y, C) 0.95 15 86 12 92
(Y, I) 0.96 98 -9 85 -14
(Y, B) 0.67 99 23 65 38
(Y, q) 0.54 87 26 72 47
(Y, M) 0.32 112 -18 93 55
(Y, Π) 0.16 104 -6 87 42
Table 3 Contemporaneous correlations with output
BMi stands for the ith benchmark model
MM stands for the main model
data: HP filtered U.S. Quarterly data, 1980.01-2006.12
data source: Fred (Federal Reserve of Economic Data)
Note:The data range and source reported here apply to all tables in this thesis; here
consumption is the sum of consumptions of households and entrepreneurs by assuming
that they have equal shares.
Table 3 presents the correlations between the main variables with output for the
four models and the data. In general the main model fits the data better than the
benchmark models, and the first benchmark model fits the data worst. The exception
is the correlation between output and consumption. In this case, the first benchmark
model outperforms the main model and other 2 benchmark models. It is only slightly
positive in the main model, comparing with almost 1 in the data. In the main model,
the correlation between output and the consumption of households actually is negative.
The reason is that, in the main model, only entrepreneurs receive money injections.
As a result, expansionary monetary policy transfers wealth from the household sector
to the entrepreneur sector. With less wealth, consumption is reduced accordingly.
Negative correlation between output and households’ consumption is a normal result
in segmented market models.4
data MM(% of data) BM1(% of data) BM2(% of data) BM3(% of data)
consumption, C 0.45 34 18 89 46
investment, I 1.86 87 30 68 43
asset price, q 6.94 45 6 22 17
Table 4. Percentage standard deviation relative to output
4See chapter 12 of The ABCs of RBCs (McCandless (2008)) for more discussions.
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Data source: S&P 500, quarterly data, 1980.01-2009.10.
Table 5 reports the simulated standard deviations of the main variables. In general,
the main model outperforms all three benchmark models, and the first benchmark
performs the worst. Most importantly, the asset price volatility in the main model is
significantly much higher than in all three benchmark models. This result shows that
combining segmented market with credit constraint is capable to produce volatile asset
price behaviors without the sticky price assumption.
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Figure 3. impulse-response to a 1% positive monetary shock
Figure 3 reports the impulse responses of the main variables to a 1% positive mone-
tary shock. There are a few interesting features. First, the main model has much larger
impulse responses than all three benchmark models. Second, the labor first increases
in response to expansionary monetary shocks, then decreases. The decrease is caused
by the inflation tax. Due to the inflation tax, the relative price of leisure drops, making
leisure a more attractive commodity, which decreases the labor supply. This result is
standard in cash-in-advance models, and adding segmented market or credit constraint
does not change this special feature of cash-in-advance models.
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Figure 4. Responses of asset price and inflation to a 1% positive monetary shock
Figure 4 presents the responses of asset prices and inflation rate after a positive
monetary shock. It shows that asset price movements are most volatile in response
to monetary shocks in the main model than the three benchmark models. Figure 5
shows the effects of expansionary monetary policy on long-term credit (bt) for the four
models. The credit expands most dramatically in the main model than the benchmark
models. Together with figure 4, it shows that asset prices move with credit expansion.
This is one of the typical facts summarized by the IMF annual report (2000).
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Figure 5. Effects of expansionary monetary policy on long-term credit
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter combines a segmented money market with a credit constraint into a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium to explain the volatile behavior of asset prices
within a flexible price model. A segmented money market produces positive responses
to output and asset prices after positive monetary shocks. The financial accelerator
effects incurred by a credit constraint then amplify the initial effects of expansionary
monetary policies. It is therefore possible to produce much larger asset price volatilities
within a flexible price framework.
Although there are a few advantages in combining credit constraint with segmented
money market models, as shown in the simulation section, there are a few shortcomings.
First, asset price volatility is much larger, but not large enough. This suggests that
there are other factors that have significant impacts on asset prices but are not examined
in this model. Second, due to the existence of large inflation tax, cash-in-advance is not
an ideal way to introduce money into general equilibrium models. It is well recognized
in the literature that in the short run, expansionary monetary policy has positive effects
on production and employment. However, strong inflation tax effects in cash-in-advance
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models usually lead to more unemployment after expansionary monetary shocks. Other
more micro-founded ways to introduce money into macroeconomic models shall be
explored.
2.6 Appendix 1: Characterization of Equilibrium
2.6.1 F.O.Cs:
F.O.C with respect to Nt:
1
Ct
= λtR
n
t (2.19)
Labor supply equation:
λt =
ξ
1−Ht
1
wt
(2.20)
Euler Equation for households:
λt = βEtλt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
(2.21)
No arbitrage condition:
EtR
n
t+1 = EtRt+1 (2.22)
Labor demand equation:
(1− α) Yt
Ht
= Retwt (2.23)
Euler equation for entrepreneurs:
1
Cet
[
qt − θEtqt+1 Πt+1
Rt+1
]
= γEt
1
Cet+1
[
qt+1 (1− δ − θ) + α Yt+1
Kt+1
]
(2.24)
Tobin’s Q:
qt = 1 + χ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(2.25)
2.6.2 Zero-Profit Condition:
Ret =
nt
nt + gt
mt
Πt
Rnt (2.26)
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2.6.3 Market Clearing Conditions:
Production function:
Yt = ztK
α
t H
1−α
t (2.27)
Consumption goods market clearing condition:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + qtIt (2.28)
Credit constraint:
bt+1 = θEtqt+1Kt+1
Πt+1
Rt+1
(2.29)
CIA constraint for entrepreneurs:
wtHt = nt + gt
mt
Πt
(2.30)
Flow budget constraint for households:
wtHt = bt+1 − btRt
Πt
+mt+1 −Rnt nt (2.31)
Evolution of money:
mt+1 = (1 + gt)
mt
Πt
(2.32)
CIA constraint for households:
Ct + nt =
mt
Πt
(2.33)
Evolution of capital:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (2.34)
2.6.4 Exogenous Shocks
ln (zt+1) = ρz ln (zt) + ε
z
t+1 (2.35)
ln (gt+1) = g + ρg ln (gt) + z
g
t+1 (2.36)
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2.7 Appendix 2: Steady State
R =
Π
β
(2.37)
Rn = R (2.38)
K
Y
=
1
α
[
1− θΠR
γ
− 1 + δ + θ
]
(2.39)
H
Y
=
(
K
Y
) α
1− α (2.40)
H =
1
3
(2.41)
Q = 1 (2.42)
Π = 1 + g (2.43)
B = θK
Π
R
(2.44)
N = (1− α) Y
R
(2.45)
M = Π
[
N (1 +R) +
(
R
Π
− 1
)
B
]
(2.46)
C =
M
Π
−N (2.47)
Ce = Y − C − δK (2.48)
Re =
N
N + gMΠ
R (2.49)
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W = (1− α) Y
H
1
Re
(2.50)
λ =
1
CR
(2.51)
ξ = λ (1−H)w (2.52)
2.8 Appendix 3: Log-Linearized System
cˆt = −λˆt − rˆnt (2.53)
λˆt =
H
1−H hˆt − wˆt (2.54)
λˆt = Et
[
λˆt+1 + rˆt+1 − pˆit+1
]
(2.55)
Etrˆ
n
t+1 = Etrˆt+1 (2.56)
yˆt = rˆ
e
t + wˆt + hˆt (2.57)
qˆt − θΠ
R
Et (qˆt+1 + pˆit+1 − rˆt+1) +
(
θ
Π
R
− 1
)
cˆet (2.58)
= γ (1− δ − θ) qˆt+1 + γαY
K
(
yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
)
+
(
θ
Π
R
− 1
)
cˆet+1
qˆt = χ
(
iˆt − kˆt
)
(2.59)
rˆt = rˆ
e
t +
R−Re
R
(gˆt + mˆt − pˆit − nˆt) (2.60)
yˆt = zˆt + αkˆt + (1− α) hˆt (2.61)
yˆt =
C
Y
cˆt +
Ce
Y
cˆet +
I
Y
iˆt (2.62)
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bˆt+1 = Et
(
qˆt+1 + kˆt+1 + pˆit+1 − rˆt+1
)
(2.63)
WH
(
wˆt + hˆt
)
= Nnˆt + g
M
Π
(gˆt + mˆt − pˆit) (2.64)
WH
(
wˆt + hˆt
)
= B
[
bt+1 − R
Π
(
bˆt + rˆt − pˆit
)]
+Mmˆt+1 −NR (rˆnt + nt) (2.65)
mˆt+1 = gˆt + mˆt − pˆit (2.66)
cˆt +
N
C
nˆt =
M
CΠ
(mˆt − pˆit) (2.67)
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + δiˆt (2.68)
zˆt+1 = ρz zˆt + ε
z
t+1 (2.69)
gˆt+1 = ρg gˆt + ε
g
t+1 (2.70)
Where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier for household’s income.
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30
3Macroeconomic Effects of
Leverage Cycles1
3.1 Introduction
A credit constraint with assets pledged as collateral is able to produce reinforcing cycles
which amplify the effects of initial exogenous shocks. This amplifying mechanism is
referred to as financial accelerator in the literature. Financial accelerator is recognised
as an important amplifying mechanism in macroeconomics. This is due to that if initial
exogenous shocks were the main causes of economic fluctuations as predicted by the
standard real business cycle (RBC) models, they have to be unreasonably large to fully
explain the cyclical behaviours of macroeconomic variables, but a model with credit
constraint is possible to produce large and persistent fluctuations even with small initial
shocks.
Though the idea of financial accelerator induced by credit constraint is old, it is
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who first develop a rigorous model.2 The literature built
on the seminal work by Kiyotaki and Moore is burgeoning and belongs to a broader
strand of literature of financial frictions.3 It is worth pointing out that Iacoviello (2005)
is the first to introduce a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit into a dynamic stochastic general
1I have benefitted greatly from the comments and suggestions of Timothy Kam, Pedro Gomis-
Porqueras, Chung Tran, Richard Dennis, Vipin Arora, Timo Henckel and three anonymous thesis
examiners.
2As noted in Chapter 2, there is another way to induce financial accelerator by using the costly-
state-verification approach as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
3For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov (2012).
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equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model developed in this chapter is based on the
Iacoviello model.
However, the quantitative importance of collateral constraints has been challenged.
Kocherlakota (2000) suggests that the quantitative effects of collateral constraints might
not be significant. Recent quantitative studies present contradictory evidences. Some
confirm the conjecture of Kocherlakota (2000), some disprove. Cordoba and Ripoll
(2004) find only weak amplifying effects of a credit constraint; Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) report negative co-movements between asset prices and investment. On the
other hand, Iacoviello (2005), Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2011), Khan and
Thomas (2013) among a few others provide evidences supporting strong amplifying ef-
fects of collateral constraints. Liu, Wang and Zha (2009, 2013) investigate this problem
by identifying which kind of shocks would induce significantly amplifying effects of col-
lateral constraints. They find that shocks which would shift the demand for collateral
assets (like patience shocks and financial shocks) would be significantly amplified by
collateral constraints, on the other hand, the amplifying effects to total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) shocks are limited due to that the prices of collateral assets and the risk
free interest rate move in the same direction, as a result, the present values of collateral
assets do not change significantly with TFP shocks.
In the literature of collateral constraints, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio has been
assumed to be exogenous. It is either assumed as a constant, examples include Kiyitaki
and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Kiyotaki, Michaelides
and Nikolov (2011), or assumed to be following an exogenous random process, examples
include Liu, Wang and Zha (2009, 2013), Gerali, Neri, Sessa And Signoretti (2010),
Khan and Thomas (2013).4 LTV ratios following an exogenous random process are
called financial shocks in the literature.
But in the real world, empirical studies (examples include Levitin and Wachter
(2010), Duca, Muellbauer and Murphysee (2011), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014))
show that the LTV ratio is not only endogenous but also pro-cyclical. The works
of Geanakoplos and others intend to provide theoretical explanations for an endoge-
nous LTV ratio.5 Geanakoplos (1997) proves the existence of an equilibrium with an
4The random LTV ratio might follow an AR(1) process, like in Liu, Wang and Zha (2009, 2013),
Gerali, Neri, Sessa And Signoretti (2010), or follow a Markov process, like in Khan and Thomas (2013).
5For a survey of this literature, see Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014).
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optimal (therefore endogenous) LTV ratio in a simple binomial model; Geanakoplos
(2003) then proves that the equilibrium LTV ratio is pro-cyclical: it is higher when
the aggregate state of the economy is high and lower when the opposite happens. The
pro-cyclical LTV ratio movements are called leverage cycles in the literature.
This chapter intends to fill the gap by developing a DSGE model with endogenous
LTV ratio to study the macroeconomic effects of leverage cycles. The results show that
by assuming an exogenous loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of a collateral constraint, either
being constant or following an exogenous random process, the amplifying effects of a
collateral constraint is undermined, even to TFP shocks.
The model developed in this chapter is a variant of the models of Iacoviello (2005)
and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). A banking sector is introduced and banks
are allowed to optimally determine the loan-to-value ratio. The key innovation is that,
instead of adopting a regular financial contract, which specifies the loan quantity, in-
terest rate and terms of maturity among other items, banks are assumed to adopt a
contract which requires assets pledged as collateral and specifies the loan-to-value ratio
among other items.6 For banking loan contracts, it is costly to monitor the behaviors
of borrowers once the loans are distributed. Collateral requirement serve as a tool to
reduce adverse selection as well as moral hazard.7 It is not surprising that collateral
loans on average account for more than 35% of the assets of banks in US.8 If interest
rates are regulated by the authorities, like in China, adjusting LTV ratios becomes even
more important for commercial banks to control risks.
In this chapter, following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), firms (entrepreneurs)
are assumed to face undiversifiable idiosyncratic shocks in addition to an aggregate
productivity shock.9 If the realized idiosyncratic shock is too low, some firms de-
6The model developed in this chapter is partially inspired by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2004). They
state that (P51) collateral requirements could affect the returns of banks, however, “for simplicity”,
they “shall ignore” the collateral requirements along with other determinants. Indeed, the trade-off
faced by a bank in this model is quite similar to that of a bank in the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981).In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the profit of a bank is not necessarily increased by charging higher
interest rate as more risk is induced; in this chapter, the profit of a bank is not necessarily increased
by setting a higher LTV ratio as more risk is induced.
7See chapter 10 of Mishkin (2011) for a detailed explanation.
8The data here only includes mortgage loans. This ratio would be even higher if loans collateralized
with other types of assets are included.
9Since the idiosyncratic shock cannot be diversified, then financial intermediaries can emerge and
specialize in dealing with this issue. This is consistent with the sprit of the influential Diamond and
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fault. Banks then have to auction the collateralized asset to get some money back. A
bankruptcy cost is assumed so that banks can only receive a fraction of the market value
of the collateralized asset. When there is a positive total factor productivity shock, the
default probability decreases, it is profitable to lend more therefore the loan-to-value is
increased. On the other hand, more lending puts more assets at risks, which tends to
increase the default probability. The reason is that for firms, more available funds lead
to more investment, the increased capital accumulation reduces the return to capital
(law of diminishing marginal return), which increases the default chances. The conflict-
ing effects of increasing loan-to-value ratio imply that there is an optimal loan-to-value
ratio such that new investment opportunity is fully exploited and the expected return
of banks is maximized.
With a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint, a positive shock increases the de-
mand for asset, which pushes up the asset price. The increased market value of collat-
eralized asset relaxes the credit constraint, inducing more borrowing as well as more
demand for asset, a reinforcing cycle begins, which is referred to as financial accelera-
tor. The mechanism of a collateral constraint with constant loan-to-value ratio can be
summarized in the following diagram:
z↑ =⇒ q↑ =⇒ B↑ =⇒ I↑ =⇒ q↑ · ··
With an endogenous loan-to-value ratio, in response to a positive shock, the optimal
loan-to-value ratio is increased as well, which relaxes the credit constraint further. The
increased loan-to-value ratio is an extra push within every reinforcing cycle. The mech-
anism of a collateral constraint with endogenous loan-to-value ratio can be summarized
in the following diagram:
z↑ =⇒ q
↑
θ↑ =⇒ B
↑↑ =⇒ I↑↑ =⇒ q
↑↑
θ↑ · ··
Comparing the mechanism diagrams above, it is obvious that the endogenous loan-
to-value ratio amplifies the financial accelerator effects of a credit constraint.
The model with endogenous LTV ratio is calibrated with US quarterly data. Simu-
lation results of this model support the arguments above. In addition, compared with a
model with constant loan-to-value ratio, the model developed here fits the data better
Dybvig (1983) model of banks.
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in first and second order moments in general. Especially, asset price movement is sig-
nificantly more volatile in the endogenous loan-to-value model, a fact often explained
poorly by standard real business cycle models as noted in the first chapter of this thesis.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follow. Section 2 discusses the details of the
model. Section 3 deals with parameterizations and simulations. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The model developed in this section closely follows Iacoviello (2005), which is a DSGE
model with exogenous loan-to-value ratio. This aims to compare and show the ef-
fects of endogenous loan-to-value ratio. There are three types of agents in the model:
households, entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries. Each is normalized to be of
measure one. Following Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), households
are heterogeneous to entrepreneurs in preferences and endowments. With respect to
preferences, households are more patient than entrepreneurs. This induces borrowing
from households to entrepreneurs. With respect to endowments, households own labor,
entrepreneurs own capital. At each period, entrepreneurs hire labor from households,
then produce final products combining labor with capital. Financial intermediaries
collect savings from households and lend them to entrepreneurs.
In addition to an aggregate total factor productivity shock, entrepreneurs suffer from
undiversifiable idiosyncratic shocks as well. This may cause bankruptcy if the realized
shock is too low. To ensure the safety of their loans, financial intermediaries require
capital pledged as collateral. When entrepreneurs are bankrupt, financial intermediaries
auction the collateralized capital to get some money back. However, this action is
costly because of bankruptcy cost. The key departure of this model from Kiyotaki &
Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005) is that, due to the possibility of bankruptcy and the
existence of bankruptcy cost, to maximize their expected profit, financial intermediaries
optimally choose a loan-to-value ratio, instead of accepting a constant loan-to-value
ratio. The decisions of financial intermediaries on loan-to-value ratio have conflicting
effects. They need to lend more (therefore increase the loan-to-value ratio) in order to
make more profits, but lending more also puts more money at risk. This implies for a
representative financial intermediary, there is an optimal loan-to-value ratio to be set
at the beginning of each period so that its profit is maximized.
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3.2.1 Households
A representative household owns one unit of labor. At the beginning of time t, a
representative household optimally determines his consumption Ct, labor supply Lt
and saving Dt+1 to maximize the discounted expected lifetime utility
max
{Ct,Lt,Dt+1}
{
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [ln (Ct) + ξ ln (1− Lt)]
}
(3.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective discount
factor.
The maximization behavior of a representative household subjects to a flow budget
constraint. Define Wt as the wage at time t and Rt as the gross interest rate for the
saving Dt from last period , the flow budget constraint for the household is:
WtLt +RtDt = Ct +Dt+1 (3.2)
Solving the optimization problem of the household yields first order conditions for
labor supply (equation (3.3)) and consumption (equation (3.4)):
ξ
1− Lt =
1
Ct
Wt (3.3)
1
Ct
= βEt
[
1
Ct+1
Rt+1
]
(3.4)
Equation (3.3) is a standard labor supply equation. Equation (3.4) is the Euler’s
equation for households.
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs
A representative entrepreneur j, combines the labor he/she hires and his/her own
capital to produce final products. The production function is a Cobb-Douglas function:
Y jt = ω
j
t ztK
α
t L
(1−α)
t (3.5)
where Y jt , Kt and Lt are final product, capital stock and labor demand at time t re-
spectively, and zt is the total factor productivity shock which follows an AR(1) process:
ln (zt+1) = ρz ln (zt) + ε
z
t+1 (3.6)
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where the parameter ρz measures the degree of persistence, ε
z
t+1 is an i.i.d random
process with zero mean and variance given by σ2z .
The idiosyncratic shock to productivity ωjt has a support domain over [0,∞) and
E
(
ωjt
)
= 1. The fixed continuous and once-differentiable distribution function of
ωjt is known to all agents in this economy as F
(
ωjt
)
. The idiosyncratic shock ωjt
is undiversifiable, and can not be observed ex ante but is free to observe once it is
realized. To simplify the problem, it is assumed that ωjt is realized after all decisions of
entrepreneurs have been made. Because E
(
ωjt
)
=
∫∞
0 ω
j
t dF
(
ωjt
)
= 1, the aggregate
behaviors of entrepreneurs are not affected by ωjt . More precisely, the representative
agent approach still works for entrepreneurs.
A representative entrepreneur has the utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
γt [ln (Cet )] (3.7)
where Cet is the entrepreneur’s consumption, the parameter γ is the discount factor. It is
assumed that γ < β, which means that entrepreneurs are less patient than households.
This assumption implies that entrepreneurs borrow from households (through financial
intermediaries) to finance their production expenditure. In addition, it makes sure that
the credit constraint (equation(3.10)) is binding around the steady state.
The flow budget constraint for the representative entrepreneur is:
Yt +Bt+1 = C
e
t +WtLt + qtIt +BtR
e
t (3.8)
where Wt, qt, R
e
t denote the wage, price for capital (Tobin’s q) and interest rate charged
by financial intermediaries respectively, It is the investment, Bt+1 is the borrowing from
financial intermediaries. The capital dynamics is described by10
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (3.9)
where δ is the depreciation ratio.
10Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), to keep the aggregate numbers of entrepreneurs
constant, the same amount of new entrepreneurs are born to substitute those bankrupt entrepreneurs,
and they are endowed with the same capital stock with other survived entrepreneurs. This assumption
simplifies the computation.
37
3. MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LEVERAGE CYCLES
The borrowing amount Bt+1 is limited to a fraction of the market value of the
collateral asset (capital):
Bt+1 ≤ θtEt
[
qt+1Kt+1
1
Ret+1
]
(3.10)
where θt is the optimal loan-to-value ratio determined by financial intermediaries at the
beginning of each time t. This equation is the Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint
with an endogenous loan-to-value ratio.
A representative entrepreneur chooses Cet , Lt, It and Kt+1 to maximize (3.7) subject
to (3.5), (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10).
The two first order conditions for labor demand and capital stock are respectively:
Wt = (1− α) Yt
Lt
(3.11)
1
Cet
[
qt − θtEtqt+1 1
Ret+1
]
= γEt
1
Cet+1
[
α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (1− δ − θt) qt+1
]
(3.12)
Equation (3.11) is a standard labor demand equation. Equation (3.12) is the Euler’s
equation for entrepreneurs.
Finally, by definition, the return to capital Rkt+1 is
Rkt+1 = Et
[
α Yt+1Kt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1
qt
]
(3.13)
which says that the return to capital is the marginal product of capital plus the capital
gains.
The above equation can be derived strictly using the approach by Luk and Vines
(2011). Assume that entrepreneurs do not conduct the production by themselves.
Instead, they rent out their capital to firms by charging Rkt+1 as unit rent. Then the
firms’ problem is to maximize their expected profits:
max
Kt+1,Lt+1
{
Yt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1Kt+1 −WtLt −Rkt+1Kt
}
The first order condition with respect to Kt+1 yields equation (3.13).
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3.2.3 Capital Producers
Entrepreneurs own the technology to produce capital goods too. They conduct the
production of capital goods through capital producers. Consistent with chapter 2 and
following Christensen and Dib (2008), capital producers adopt a linear technology to
transfer a fraction of consumption goods to capital goods while subject to a quadratic
adjustment cost specified as
χ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt.
Capital producers’ problem is to maximize their profit by choosing the quantity of
investment It:
max
It
Et
[
qtIt − It − χ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt
]
(3.14)
The first order condition with respect to It is
Et
[
qt − 1− χ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)]
= 0 (3.15)
This equation is a standard Tobin’s Q equation that relates the price of capital
to its marginal adjustment cost. Since at the steady state, I¯ = δK¯, the steady state
value of qt equals to 1. The technology to produce capital is constant return-to-scale,
therefore the profit of capital producers is zero.
3.2.4 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are owned by households. A representative Financial interme-
diary collects savings Dt+1 from households, then lends the savings to entrepreneurs.
To describe the behavior of financial intermediaries, the bankruptcy (default) proba-
bility function of entrepreneurs needs to be defined first. Since at each period, ωt is
unique for each entrepreneur, it is convenient to index entrepreneurs by ωt, though ωt
does not affect the aggregate behaviors of entrepreneurs, as elaborated at the beginning
of section 3.2.
At the end of each period t+ 1, both individual and aggregate shocks are realized.
Entrepreneurs sell their products and use this liquidity income to pay for the wage
bill to workers, and use the left over to pay back the loans plus interests to financial
intermediaries. There is a threshold level ωt+1, such that the left over is just enough
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to pay for the loans plus the interests. define this threshold level ωt+1 as ω¯t+1, and it
should satisfy:
ω¯t+1Yt+1 −Wt+1Lt+1 −Ret+1Bt+1 = 0 (3.16)
The above equation says that the income for the specific entrepreneur ω¯t+1 is just
enough to pay for the wage bill and the due loan plus interests.
The distribution function of ωt+1 is fixed and common knowledge. Define
Γ (ω¯t+1) =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1dF (ωt+1) (3.17)
as the bankruptcy (default) probability function of entrepreneurs. If ωt+1 ≥ ω¯t+1,
entrepreneurs survive, financial intermediaries will make new loans to them for the
next period. If ωt+1 < ω¯t+1, these entrepreneurs are claimed to be bankrupt. The
banks have to auction their asset (capital) to get some money back.11 Assume the
bankruptcy cost is (1− µ), i.e., after the auction, banks can only get µ fraction of the
market value of the asset. Then the banks’ problem at the beginning of time t is to set
an optimal loan-to-value ratio θt to maximize the expected return
max
θt
Et
 [1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1
Bt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
θtEt
(
qt+1Kt+1
1
Ret+1
)
+µΓ (ω¯t+1) (1− δ)Et (qt+1Kt+1)
 (3.18)
where θtEt
(
qt+1Kt+1
1
Ret+1
)
= Bt+1 is the amount loaned to entrepreneurs. [1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]
is the fraction of loan that is safe. Therefore [1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1θtEt
(
qt+1Kt+1
1
Ret+1
)
is the return from safe loan. Γ (ω¯t+1) is the fraction of entrepreneurs that defaults,
(1− δ)Et (qt+1Kt+1) is the market value of their capital stock at time t+1, and µ is the
fraction that can be collected back after the auction. So µΓ (ω¯t+1) (1− δ)Et (qt+1Kt+1)
is the return from bankrupt entrepreneurs.
The optimal behavior of financial intermediaries yielding a first order condition for
θt
θt =
1− Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
+ µ (1− δ) (3.19)
11Potential buyers could be survived entrepreneurs, new-born entrepreneurs or capital producers,
who then sell them to entrepreneurs. They all buy the auctioned asset at the market value qt+1.
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Finally, it is supposed that financial intermediaries are in a complete competitive
market thus face zero-profit constraint, i.e.,
[1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1Bt+1 + µΓ (ω¯t+1) (1− δ)Et (qt+1Kt+1) = Rt+1Dt+1 (3.20)
3.2.5 Properties of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt
To proceed to the next section, the properties of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt need to be examined
first. From equations (3.17) and (3.19), we have:
Γ (ω¯t+1) =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1dF (ωt+1) (3.21)
θt =
1− Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
+ µ (1− δ) (3.22)
It will be shown later in this section that both the default probability function
Γ (ω¯t+1) and the optimal loan-to-value ratio θt are implicit functions of Yt+1, Bt+1 and
Ret+1. When we do log-linearization of these two implicit functions around the steady
state in the next section, only first order derivatives matter. The purpose of this section
is to determine the qualitative relationship of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt with respect to Yt+1, Bt+1
and Ret+1. This determines the signs of their first order derivatives.
Notice that the only choice variable for financial intermediaries is θt. An individual
financial intermediary is atomic. When it makes decision about θt, it should take
all prices as well as variables determined by entrepreneurs and households as given.
Specifically, financial intermediaries take Yt+1, Bt+1 and R
e
t+1 as given. Since financial
intermediaries are homogeneous, the representative intermediary’s choice is also the
aggregate behavior of the financial intermediary sector.
Similar to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), the optimal loan-to-value ratio
problem can be seen as a partial-equilibrium financial contract problem.12 In a partial
12In Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), banks take the net worth Nt, interest rate paid to
households Rt and interest rate charged on entrepreneurs R
e
t as given, then optimally determine their
capital supply Kt+1 and the optimal threshold of idiosyncratic shock ω¯. Nt, Rt and R
e
t are then
determined in a general equilibrium. From the first order condition, it is proved that risk premium
Ret
Rt
is an implicit function of capital/wealth ratio
Qt−1Kt
Nt
. To solve the model, they derive the qualitative
relationship between
Ret
Rt
and
Qt−1Kt
Nt
from the first order conditions. The implicit function of
Ret
Rt
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equilibrium, financial intermediaries take Yt+1, Bt+1 and R
e
t+1 as given and optimally
choose the loan-to-value ratio θt to maximize their expected return. Then Yt+1, Bt+1
and Ret+1 are determined in a general equilibrium.
First derive the threshold value ω¯t+1 from equation (3.16), and use the property of
constant return-to-scale production function that Wt+1Lt+1 = (1− α)Yt+1:
ω¯t+1 = (1− α) +
Ret+1Bt+1
Yt+1
(3.23)
From the above equation, ω¯t+1 is a function of Yt+1, R
e
t+1 and Bt+1. Take the
derivatives of all three variables respectively:
∂ω¯t+1
∂Yt+1
= −R
e
t+1Bt+1
(Yt+1)
2 < 0 (3.24)
∂ω¯t+1
∂Ret+1
=
Bt+1
Yt+1
> 0 (3.25)
∂ω¯t+1
∂Bt+1
=
Ret+1
Yt+1
> 0 (3.26)
Since Γ (ω¯t+1) =
∫ ω¯
0 ωt+1dF (ωt+1) increases in ω¯t+1, that is,
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
> 0, there-
fore
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Yt+1
= −∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
Ret+1Bt+1
(Yt+1)
2 < 0 (3.27)
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Bt+1
=
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
Ret+1
Yt+1
> 0 (3.28)
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Ret+1
=
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂ω¯t+1
Bt+1
Yt+1
> 0 (3.29)
The economic meanings of above three equations are very clear. The first equation
says that financial intermediaries rationally expect the default probability decreases if
production Yt+1 increases given other variables; the second equation means that the
is log-linearized around the steady state. The only thing matters in a linear system is the first order
derivatives, whose signs are already determined. I use the same partial equilibrium/general equilibrium
trick in this section.
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increase of borrowing cost Ret+1 leads to more bankruptcy; the third equation states
that lending more puts more asset at risk.13
Since Bt+1 = θtEt
(
qt+1Kt+1
1
Ret+1
)
, so
∂Bt+1
∂θt
= qt+1Kt+1
1
Ret
> 0. Combining with
equation (3.28), we have
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
=
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Bt+1
∂Bt+1
∂θt
(3.30)
=
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
qt+1
Kt+1
Yt+1
> 0
Equation (3.22) characterizes the optimal decision rule for θt. Applying the prop-
erties of Γ (ω¯t+1) to equation (3.22), we have the properties of θt:
∂θt
∂Yt+1
=
−∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Yt+1
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
> 0 (3.31)
∂θt
∂Bt+1
=
−∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Bt+1
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
< 0 (3.32)
∂θt
∂Ret+1
=
−∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Ret+1
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
< 0 (3.33)
The economic meanings of the above three equations are consistent with intuitions.
It says that in response to an increase of a variable which is expected to reduce the
bankruptcy probability (Yt+1), the optimal choice for financial intermediaries is to
increase the loan-to-value ratio θt; in response to an increase of variables which are ex-
pected to raise the bankruptcy probability (Bt+1, R
e
t+1), the optimal choice for financial
intermediaries is to lower the loan-to-value ratio θt.
13Like in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), these qualitative relationships are rational expecta-
tions of financial intermediaries in a partial equilibrium, and they are true when the general equilibrium
is reached because they are “rationally expected”.
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For convenience, define Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt as implicit functions of Yt+1, Bt+1 and R
e
t+1.
That is:
Γ (ω¯t+1) = ψ
( −
Yt+1,
+
Bt+1,
+
Ret+1
)
(3.34)
θt = φ
(
+
Yt+1,
−
Bt+1,
−
Ret+1
)
(3.35)
The signs above the variables stand for the qualitative relationship with θt or
Γ (ω¯t+1) respectively. Then in the next section, the two implicit functions are log-
linearized around the steady state. The only thing matters in a linear system is first
order derivatives, of which signs and values have been settled in this section.
3.2.6 Market Clearing Conditions and Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, the markets for goods, labor, loanable fund all clear. The
goods market clearing condition is:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + qtIt (3.36)
The market clearing condition for credit market is:
Bt+1 = Dt+1 (3.37)
A competitive equilibrium then can be defined as sequences of prices {Wt, qt, Rt, Ret}∞t=0
and sequences of allocations {Yt, Ct, Cet , It, Lt, θt,Γ (ω¯t) , Dt, Bt,Kt}∞t=0 such that (i)
taking prices as given, the allocations solve the optimizing problems for households,
entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries and (ii) all markets clear. A full characteri-
zation of the equilibrium is presented in Appendix A.
Appendix B describes the steady state. Let hatted variables denote percentage de-
viations from the steady state, and those without subscript time index denote steady
state values. The model can be reduced to a log-linearized system described in Ap-
pendix C.
The log-linearized form of the two implicit functions (3.34) and (3.35) are respec-
tively:
Γˆ (ω¯t) = Gyyˆt +Gbbˆt +Grrˆ
e
t (3.38)
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θˆt = Tyyˆt+1 + Tbbˆt+1 + Trrˆ
e
t+1 (3.39)
where
Gy =
1
Γ (ω¯)
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
(3.40)
Gb =
1
Γ (ω¯)
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Bt
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
(3.41)
Gr =
1
Γ (ω¯)
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Ret
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
(3.42)
Ty =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(3.43)
Tb =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(3.44)
Tr =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(3.45)
The properties of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt presented above restricted the signs of these six
parameters, that is, Gy, Tb and Tr are negative, Ty, Gb and Gr are positive. However,
the exact values depend on the function form of the distribution function F (ω¯t), espe-
cially, depend on the value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
, which is the first order derivative of the
distribution function of Γ (ωt) with respect to ωt taking value at the steady state. See
appendix D for details on deriving these six parameters.
3.3 Model Simulations
In this section, the results of some numerical experiments are presented. To compare,
a benchmark model is developed. This benchmark model shuts down the optimal loan-
to-value ratio channel while shares the other features of the model described in the last
section. Instead of optimally determining a loan-to-value ratio, financial intermediaries
in the benchmark model fixate the loan-to-value ratio to its steady state value.14 For
14Mathematically, in the benchmark model, equation (3.34) is taken away, and θt equals to its steady
state value θ in all equations characterize the competitive equilibrium.
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convenience, in the following parts, the model developed in the last section is referred
to as the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model (endo. LTV in short), the benchmark
model is referred to as the exogenous loan-to-value ratio model (exo. LTV in short).
The simulation results show that a model with endogenous loan-to-value ratio can
generate much larger and more persistence impulse response to total factor productivity
shocks. The first and second order moments generated by the two models are presented
and compared with the US data. In general, the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model
fits the data better than the benchmark model. Especially, asset price movements are
more volatile in the endogenous loan-to-value model, a fact that is explained poorly by
standard real business cycle models.
3.3.1 Model Parameterizations
The parameter values are reported in table 1. The coefficient of Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function α, the depreciation ratio δ and the persistence parameter of real shock
ρz are set as (or around) 1/3, 0.025 and 0.95 respectively. The households’ discounting
factor β is calibrated such that the quarterly risk free interest rate equals to 1.01%.
The parameter ξ for leisure (1− Lt) is calibrated such that the steady state of labor is
1/3. These parameter values are conventional in standard real business cycle models.
Consistent with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), the discounting fac-
tor of entrepreneurs γ = 0.96. The marginal adjust cost χ is estimated by Christensen
and Dib (2008) as 0.58. Consistent with Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), The
steady state bankruptcy rate of Γ (ω¯t) is set as 0.05, which is the long-run average
bankruptcy rate in US. The bankruptcy cost (1− µ) is calibrated such that the steady
state value of the quarterly risky interest rate Re equals to 1.03, which is the long-run
average risky interest rate in US. Consistent with chapter 2, the steady state value of
the loan-to-value ratio θ is set as 0.3.
The first order derivative of the distribution function Γ (ωt) with respect to ωt taking
value at the steady state,
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
, is a key parameter to the model developed
above. It largely determines the values of the parameters of equations (3.38) and (3.39),
the two key equations in characterizing the model. However, it is also non-standard
and specific to the model above. The strategy adopted here is to pick an ad hoc value
for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
, such that the parameter values for equations (3.38) and (3.39) are
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“reasonable” in the sense that they are neither too large nor too small.15 The value
of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
is set as 0.005 in the first place. As shown in appendix D, the value
of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
together with steady state values of θ, Y , K, B and Re determine the
values of Gy, Gb, Gr and Ty, Tb, Tr. And the higher
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
, the higher absolute
values of Gy, Gb and Gr. The values of Gy, Gb, Gr and Ty, Tb, Tr together with the
sensitivity analysis are reported in appendix E. The sensitivity analysis is about the
robustness of the simulation results with respect to different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
It shows that as long as the value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
is low, qualitatively the simulation
results are robust.
parameter notation value
household’s discount factor β 0.99
entrepreneur’s discount factor γ 0.96
depreciation ratio δ 0.025
total capital income share α 1/3
marginal adjustment cost χ 0.58
parameter for leisure ξ 0.77
steady state LTV ratio θ 0.3
bankruptcy cost 1− µ 0.32
persistence of shock ρz 0.95
Slope of Γ (ω¯)
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
0.005
Table 1. Parameter Values
3.3.2 Simulation Results
Table 2 presents the percentage standard deviations of the main variables relative to
output for the date and the two models. All two models tend to over-predict the
volatilities of variables except for asset price qt and working hour Lt. The exogenous
loan-to-value ratio model only accounts for 9% of the asset price volatility. The en-
dogenous loan-to-value ratio model accounts for 22%. This is far from enough, but it
is a more than 100% improvement.
15To set the value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
is equivalent to set the standard deviation of the distribution
function F (ω). Since the mean of ω equals to one by assumption, then given the value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
,
we can solve for the standard deviation of F (ω) as long as we know the distribution form.
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data Endo. LTV (% of data) Exo. LTV (% of data)
consumption, C 0.45 169 155
investment, I 1.86 103 78
Labor, L 0.53 61 46
asset price, q 6.94 22 9
Table 2. Percentage standard deviation relative to output
Note: in this section, consumption is defined as the sum of consumptions of both the
household sector and the entrepreneur sector.
Table 3 presents the contemporaneous correlations between the main variables for
the data and the two models. The exogenous loan-to-value ratio model over-predicts all
correlations. The endogenous loan-to-value ratio model also over-predicts correlations
between output & investment and output & bank loan, and slightly fits the data better
than the exogenous loan-to-value ratio model. In particular, with respect to correlations
between output & consumption, the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model accounts for
more than 99% of the data, while the exogenous loan-to-value ratio model over-predicts.
It is interesting that both models fit the data quite well for the correlation between bank
loan & asset price. This verifies the importance of credit constraint (with or without
optimal loan-to-value ratio) to explain the typical fact of positive co-movement between
credit and asset prices.16
data Endo. LTV (% of data) Exo. LTV (% of data)
(Y, C) 0.95 99 112
(Y, I) 0.96 106 114
(Y, B) 0.67 187 192
(Y, q) 0.54 83 104
Table 3, Contemporaneous correlations
In terms of first-order autocorrelations, as we can see from Table 4, in general, the
two models over-predict the autocorrelations of all main variables. But the endogenous
loan-to-value ratio model performs slightly better than the exogenous loan-to-value
ratio model. Especially, the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model predicts almost per-
fectly about the autocorrelation of output, while the benchmark model over-predicts.
16The annual report of IMF (2000) summarized this typical fact among others. In the second
chapter I compared different models with or without the credit constraint, the results also support this
conclusion.
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3.3 Model Simulations
To summarize, the credit constraint models tend to over-predict the first and second
order moments of variables except for the volatility of asset price and labor. However,
the credit constraint model with endogenous loan-to-value ratio fits the data better
in general. In particular, an endogenous loan-to-value ratio mechanism significantly
improves the explanatory power of flexible price models in accounting for asset price
volatilities. However, including this mechanism only partially succeeds in fully explain-
ing the high volatilities of asset prices.
data Endo. LTV (% of data) Exo. LTV (% of data)
output, Y 0.98 99 105
consumption, C 0.90 114 120
investment, I 0.96 112 118
bank loan, B 0.92 105 116
asset price, q 0.89 103 107
Table 4. First-order autocorrelations
Figure 1 and 2 are impulse responses of the main variables in response to a 1%
positive productivity shock. For both models, the bankruptcy rate Γ (ω¯t) decreases
immediately after the shock. To exploit this opportunity, banks in the endogenous
loan-to-value ratio model increase the loan-to-value ratio θt. By assumption, there is
no change of θt in the exogenous loan-to-value ratio model. Compared to the exoge-
nous loan-to-value ratio model, the increase of θt in the endogenous loan-to-value ratio
model leads to a higher production Yt, a much higher capital accumulation Kt, a more
significant rise in asset price qt, and spurs a much larger bank loans to entrepreneurs
by relaxing the credit constraint (Bt+1 = θtE
[
Kt+1
1
Ret+1
]
) further.
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Figure 1. impulse response to a 1% positive TFP shock
There are additional interesting features reflected in these two figures. In figure 2,
the bankruptcy rate Γ (ω¯t) decreases less in the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model
than in the exogenous loan-to-value ratio model. This reflects the fact that in the en-
dogenous loan-to-value ratio model, banks exploit the new investment opportunity and
increase their loans to entrepreneurs for more returns. Lending more puts more money
at risks and increases the bankruptcy rate, as stated in equation (3.29). Entrepreneurs
buy more capital with more bank loans, which reduces the return to capital Rkt because
of the law of diminishing marginal return to capital, as shown on the left top on figure
2. This provides an evidence that by allowing banks optimally setting a loan-to-value
ratio, the economy operates more efficient in the sense that no opportunity is wasted.
Finally, more bank loans in the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model also leads to
a higher risk premium (Ret − Rt), as shown in the bottom right on figure 2. This is
consistent with the data as well as intuition. In a world of uncertainty, more lending
puts more money at risk (a higher bankruptcy chances), which require a higher risk
premium to compensate the extra risks.
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Figure 2. impulse response to a 1% positive TFP shock
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter develops a real dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with credit
constraint in which the loan-to-value ratio is endogenized. The loan-to-value ratio is
optimally determined by financial intermediaries to maximize their expected returns.
The model developed in this chapter is cable to explain the fact of pro-cyclical loan-to-
value ratios. In addition, the endogenous loan-to-value ratio mechanism amplifies the
effects of financial accelerator and produces much larger asset price volatilities. This
improves the ability of flexible price models to explain volatile asset price movements.
As suggested by Liu, Wang and Zha (2009, 2013), credit constraint with fixed loan-
to-value ratio is incapable to significantly amplify the effects caused by TFP shocks.
This is due to that the risk-free interest rate and the asset prices move into the same
direction in response to TFP shocks, as a result, the present value of collateral as-
sets only increases moderately which in turn leads to moderate credit increases. This
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chapter shows that the amplifying effects of credit constraints are underestimated by
assuming a constant loan-to-value ratio. When the loan-to-value ratio is endogenous
and pro-cyclical, it functions like an accelerator to the financial accelerator. Compared
with a constant loan-to-value ratio model, the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model is
able to produce much larger amplifying effects to TFP shocks.
Liu, Wang and Zha (2009, 2013) find that the amplifying effects of credit constraints
are significant with respect to demand shocks including the loan-to-value ratio shocks.
It is interesting to compare the effects of loan-to-value ratio shocks in an exogenous
loan-to-value ratio model to the effects of TFP shocks in an endogenous loan-to-value
ratio model. The amplifying effects of loan-to-value ratio shocks would be larger as
the amplifying effects of endogenous loan-to-value ratio are partially comprised by the
increase of risk-free interest rate. However, the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model
developed in this chapter suggests that the loan-to-value ratio is not exogenous, either
it being a constant or random shock. With endogenous loan-to-value ratio, credit
constraints would produce even larger amplifying effects with respect to other demand
shocks, which would be underestimated when the loan-to-value ratio is assumed being
random shocks.
3.5 Appendix A: Characterization of Equilibrium
labor supply equation:
ξ
1− Lt = Wt
1
Ct
(3.46)
Euler equation of households:
1
Ct
= βEt
[
1
Ct+1
Rt+1
]
(3.47)
labor demand equation:
Wt = (1− α) Yt
Lt
(3.48)
Euler equation of entrepreneurs:
1
Cet
[
qt − θtEtqt+1 1
Ret+1
]
= γEt
1
Cet+1
[
α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (1− δ − θt) qt+1
]
(3.49)
marginal adjustment cost of investment (Tobin’s Q):
qt = 1 + χ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(3.50)
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Zero-Profit Condition:
[1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1Bt+1 + µΓ (ω¯t+1) (1− δ)Et (qt+1Kt+1) = Rt+1Dt+1 (3.51)
optimal loan-to-value ratio:
θt = φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
(3.52)
bankruptcy probability function:
Γ (ω¯t+1) = ψ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
(3.53)
production function:
Yt = ztK
α
t L
1−α
t (3.54)
consumption market clear condition:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + qtIt (3.55)
credit constraint:
Bt+1 = θtEtqt+1Kt+1
1
Rt+1
(3.56)
credit market clear condition:
Bt+1 = Dt+1 (3.57)
budget constraint of households:
WtLt +RtDt = Ct +Dt+1 (3.58)
evolution of capital:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (3.59)
Exogenous Shock:
ln (zt+1) = ρz ln (zt) + ε
z
t+1 (3.60)
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3.6 Appendix B: Steady State
R =
1
β
(3.61)
1− θ 1
Re
= γ
[
α
Y
K
+ 1− δ − θ
]
(3.62)
Y = KαL1−α (3.63)
B = θK
1
Re
(3.64)
B = D (3.65)
W = (1− α) Y
L
(3.66)
[1− Γ (ω¯)]ReB + µΓ (ω¯) (1− δ)K = RD (3.67)
Γ (ω¯) =
∫ ∞
0
ω¯dF (ω¯) (3.68)
ω¯ = (1− α) + R
eB
Y
(3.69)
θ =
1− Γ (ω¯)
∂Γ (ω¯)
∂ω¯
+ µ (1− δ) (3.70)
WL+DR = C +D (3.71)
Ce = Y − C − δK (3.72)
λ =
1
CR
(3.73)
ξ = λ (1− L)w (3.74)
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3.7 Appendix C: Log-linearized System
L
1− Llˆt = −cˆt + wˆt (3.75)
−cˆt = Et [−cˆt+1 + rˆt+1] (3.76)
yˆt = wˆt + lˆt (3.77)(
θ
1
Re
− 1
)
cˆet + qˆt − θ
1
Re
(
θˆt + qˆt+1 − rˆet+1
)
= (3.78)(
θ
1
Re
− 1
)
cˆet+1 + γ
[
α
Y
K
(
yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
)
+ (1− δ − θ)qˆt+1 − θθˆt
]
qˆt = χ
(
iˆt − kˆt
)
(3.79)
Γˆ (ω¯t) = Gyyˆt +Gbbˆt +Grrˆ
e
t (3.80)
θˆt = Tyyˆt+1 + Tbbˆt+1 + Trrˆ
e
t+1 (3.81)
yˆt = zˆt + αkˆt + (1− α) lˆt (3.82)
yˆt =
C
Y
cˆt +
Ce
Y
cˆet +
I
Y
iˆt (3.83)
bˆt+1 = Et
(
θˆt + qˆt+1 + kˆt+1 − rˆt+1
)
(3.84)
bˆt+1 = dˆt+1 (3.85)
WL
(
wˆt + lˆt
)
+RD
(
rˆt + dˆt
)
= Ccˆt +Ddˆt+1 (3.86)
kˆt+1 = (1− δ) kˆt + δiˆt (3.87)
zˆt+1 = ρz zˆt + ε
z
t+1 (3.88)
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3.8 Appendix D: log-linearization of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt
From section 3.3, we know that, Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt are implicit functions of Yt+1, Bt+1,
and Ret+1. (Equations (3.34) and (3.35) in the text.):
Γ (ω¯t) = ψ
(−
Yt,
+
Bt,
+
Ret
)
(3.89)
θt = φ
(
+
Yt+1,
−
Bt+1,
−
Ret+1
)
(3.90)
We take Taylor’s first-order extensions on the implicit functions of Γ (ω¯t) = ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
and θt = φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
with respect to Yt, Bt and R
e
t at the steady state, then
use the log-linearization approximation formula, we have:
Γˆ (ω¯t) = Gyyˆt +Gbbˆt +Grrˆ
e
t (3.91)
θˆt = Tyyˆt+1 + Tbbˆt+1 + Trrˆ
e
t+1 (3.92)
where
Gy =
1
ψ (Yt, Bt, Ret )
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
=
1
ψ (Yt, Bt, Ret )
(
−∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
RetBt
Y 2t
)∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
= − 1
Γ (ω¯)
ReB
Y 2
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
The second step uses the result from section 3.3: equation (3.27). Similarly, we can get
the values for the other five parameters using the properties of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt from
the section 3.3:
Gb =
1
Γ (ω¯)
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Bt
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
(3.93)
=
1
Γ (ω¯)
Re
Y
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
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Gr =
1
Γ (ω¯)
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Ret
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
(3.94)
=
1
Γ (ω¯)
B
Y
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
Ty =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(3.95)
=
1
θ
ReB
YK
Tb =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(3.96)
= −1
θ
Re
K
Tr =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(3.97)
= −1
θ
B
K
And it is clearly from the formulas above that the values of these six parameters
depend on the steady state values of Γ (ω¯t+1), θt, Yt, Bt, Kt and R
e
t (whose values are
listed in appendix B) as well as
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
3.9 Appendix E: Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix reports the sensitivity analysis for the six parameters in these two equa-
tions with respect to different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
:
Γˆ (ω¯t) = Gyyˆt +Gbbˆt +Grrˆ
e
t (3.98)
θˆt = Tyyˆt+1 + Tbbˆt+1 + Trrˆ
e
t+1 (3.99)
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Table 1 reports the values of Gy, Gb, Gr and Ty, Tb, Tr for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
. It is clear from this table that the higher value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
, the
larger the gap between Gy and Gb, Gr as well as Ty and Tb, Tr.
∂Γ (ω¯)
∂ω¯
Gy Gb Gr Ty Tb Tr
0.001 -0.9780 0.0185 0.9495 0.5387 -0.0189 -0.9709
0.005 -2.5688 0.1276 2.4940 0.7433 -0.0497 -0.9709
0.01 -3.8936 0.2931 3.7802 0.8538 -0.0753 -0.9709
Table E1:
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
and the six parameters
Figure E1 reports the impulse response of θt and Yt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
The first row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.001, the second row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.01.
The results of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.005 are reported in the main text.
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Figure E1. impulse response of YT and θt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
Figure E2 presents the impulse response of Γt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
The first row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.001, the second row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.01.
The results of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.005 are reported in the main text.
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Figure E2. impulse response of Γt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
The sensitivity analysis shows that, first, the qualitative relationship is robust to
the values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
as long as it is quite low.
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60
4Leverage Cycles and Housing
Prices1
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 a real DSGE model with endogenous loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is developed
which requires tangible capital (Kt) as the collateral asset. It shows that the endogenous
LTV ratio mechanism improves the ability of credit constraint models to explain the
volatile movements of the price of capital (Tobin’s Q). However, in the real world, not all
capital is suitable for collateral. Land and houses are two most favorable tangible assets
for collateral requirement. This fact is partially due to their immobility, partially due
to their relatively high liquidity compared with other tangible capital (like machines)
and intangible assets (like human capital). It is almost costless to guard land or houses
in case the borrowers cheat, and it is relatively easy to auction a land or house in case
the borrowers default. It is not surprising that mortgage loans on average account for
more than 35% of American banks’ asset for decades since the second world war.
As a result, it is not surprising that land/houses are the collateral assets in most
credit constraint models ever since Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who develop the first
rigorous credit constraint model with land as collateral. Some writers aim to examine
the extent to which collateral constraints can explain housing price movements. For
example, Iacoviello (2005) introduces a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint into a
1I have benefitted greatly from the comments and suggestions from Timothy Kam, Pedro Gomis-
Porqueras, Richard Dennis, Chung Tran and Timo Henckel and three anonymous thesis examiners.
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New Keynesian model and verifies the significant amplifying effects of credit constraint
to demand shocks on production as well as housing prices calibrated and estimated
with the US data; with land as collateral in their model, Liu, Wang and Zha (2009,
2013) have identified shocks which make the positive co-movements between land prices
and investment a driving force of the land-price dynamics on the macro-economy.
In this chapter, the model developed in the last chapter is extended to include a
housing sector. This aims to examine the effects of credit constraints with endogenous
LTV ratio on housing prices. The endogenous and pro-cyclical movements of LTV ratios
are referred to as leverage cycles in the literature (Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014)). As
such, this chapter is also about the relationship between leverage cycles and housing
prices.
Empirical studies find that fluctuations in housing prices are primarily driven by
changes in land prices (Davis and Heathcote (2007)). And since the supply of land
is fixed in most cases, it does little harm to the ability of a model in explaining the
behavior of housing prices by assuming the housing supply being fixed. Indeed, the
research by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) finds that the housing supply dynamics have no
significant effects on the housing price dynamics. For these reasons, the housing supply
is assumed to be constant in the model of this chapter. And housing price and land
price are interchangeable in this chapter.
In the last chapter, it is argued that collateral requirements serve as a method
to reduce moral hazards and setting an optimal LTV ratio is an important way to
control risks for banks. A financial contract specifying the LTV ratio is not a standard
financial contract in the macroeconomic literature, which usually only specifies the loan
quantity and interest rate among other items. However, it worth mentioning that a
standard mortgage loan contract in the real world usually specifies the down-payment
ratio (which equals to (1 - LTV ratio)), interest rates and other items. The optimal
financial contract derived in the last chapter is quite consistent with the mortgage loan
contract in the real world.Therefore, it is quite suitable to extend the model developed
in the last chapter to include houses as collateral. With houses as collateral, the optimal
financial contract derived in this chapter is even more consistent with a mortgage loan
in the real world.2
2Cheung (1970) argues that usually a contract is structural and there is an optimal structure for
a contract with different transaction costs. The discrepancies between a standard financial contract
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4.2 The Model
The model is calibrated with the US data and the simulation results are consistent
with the last chapter: the housing price is much more volatile in response to total factor
productivity (TFP) shocks, and in general, the endogenous LTV ratio model fits the
data better than the exogenous LTV ratio model.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follow. Part 2 discusses the details of the model.
Part 3 deals with parameterizations and simulations. Part 4 concludes this chapter.
4.2 The Model
The model developed here closely follows the model of chapter 3. There are three types
of agents in the model: households, entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries. Each is
normalized to be of measure one. Households own labor, entrepreneurs own capital. At
each period, entrepreneurs hire labor from households, and produce final products com-
bining labor with capital and houses. Households are more patient than entrepreneurs.
This assumption introduces borrowing from households to entrepreneurs. Financial in-
termediaries collect savings from households and lend them to entrepreneurs. Finally,
the house supply is assumed to be constant, as explained in the introduction section.
4.2.1 Households
A representative household owns one unit of labor. At the beginning of time t, a
representative household optimally determine his/her consumption Ct, labor supply
Lt, saving Dt+1 and housing stock H
c
t+1 to maximize the discounted expected lifetime
utility
max
{
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [ln (Ct) + ξh ln (H
c
t ) + ξl ln (1− Lt)]
}
(4.1)
where E is the expectation operator. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective
discount factor. The utility of households comes from consumption Ct, housing service
Hct and leisure (1− Lt). The maximization behavior of the household subjects to a
flow budget constraint. Denotes Wt as the wage, Rt as the gross risk-free interest rate
in the macroeconomic literature and a standard mortgage loan contract in the real world show that
macroeconomists care little about the structure of financial contract. The models developed in this
chapter and the last chapter intend to narrow this gap in a sense.
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for the saving Dt from last period , P
h
t as housing price at time t, the flow budget
constraint for the household is:
WtLt + P
h
t H
c
t +RtDt = P
h
t H
c
t+1 + Ct +Dt+1 (4.2)
Solving the optimization problem of the household yields first order conditions for
labor supply (equation(4.3)) and two Euler equations with respect to Dt+1 (equation
(4.4)) and Hct+1 (equation (4.5))
ξ
1− Lt =
1
Ct
Wt (4.3)
1
Ct
= βEt
[
1
Ct+1
Rt+1
]
(4.4)
1
Ct
P ht = βEt
[
1
Ct+1
P ht+1 + ξH
1
Hct
]
(4.5)
Equation(4.3) is the standard labor supply equation. Equation(4.4) is the standard
Euler equation. Equation(4.5) can be re-written as:
1
Ct
= βEt
[
1
Ct+1
P ht+1
P ht
+ ξH
1
P ht H
c
t
]
(4.6)
Compare equation (4.6) with equation (4.4), according to the no arbitrage condition,
we have:
[
1
Ct+1
Rt+1
]
=
[
1
Ct+1
P ht+1
P ht
+ ξH
1
P ht H
c
t
]
(4.7)
From the equation above, we can see that households are willing to tolerate a
relatively lower return from housing investment (
P ht+1
P ht
) compared with the return from
financial asset Dt+1, since there is a housing service premium ξH
1
P ht H
c
t
.
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4.2.2 Entrepreneurs
A representative entrepreneur j, combines hired labor, owned capital and houses to
produce final product. The production function is a Cobb-Douglas function:
Y jt = ω
j
t zt
[
(Het )
ηK1−ηt
]α
L1−αt (4.8)
where Y jt , H
e
t , Kt and Lt denote final product, owned houses, capital stock and labor
demand at time t respectively. The parameters α ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1) measure the
output elasticities of these three inputs. zt is the productivity shock which follows an
AR(1) process:
ln (zt+1) = ρz ln (zt) + ε
z
t+1 (4.9)
where the parameter ρz measures the degree of persistence, ε
z
t+1 is an i.i.d random
process with zero mean and variance given by σ2z .
In equation (4.8), ωjt ∈ [0,∞) is the idiosyncratic shock to productivity with
E
(
ωjt
)
= 1. The fixed continuous distribution function of ωjt is known to all agents in
this economy as F
(
ωjt
)
. The idiosyncratic shock ωjt can not be observed ex ante but is
free to observe once it is realized. To simplify the problem, it is assumed that ωjt is real-
ized after all decisions of entrepreneurs are done. Because E
(
ωjt
)
=
∫∞
0 ω
j
t dF
(
ωjt
)
=
1, the aggregate behaviors of entrepreneurs are not affected by ωjt . More precisely, the
representative agent approach still works for entrepreneurs.
A representative entrepreneur has the utility function
E
∞∑
t=0
γt [ln (Cet )] (4.10)
where Cet denotes the entrepreneur’s consumption, the parameter γ is the subjective
discount factor. It is assumed that 0 < γ < β, which means that entrepreneurs are
less patient than households. This assumption implies that entrepreneurs borrow from
households (through financial intermediaries) to finance for their expenditure. In ad-
dition, it makes sure that the credit constraint (equation (4.13)) is binding around the
steady state. This means that for small shocks, the credit constraint is always binding,
and therefore can be log-linearized around its steady state.
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The flow budget constraint for the representative entrepreneur is
Yt +Bt+1 + P
h
t H
e
t = C
e
t +WtLt + qtIt + P
h
t H
e
t+1 +BtR
e
t (4.11)
where Wt, qt, R
e
t denote the wage, price for capital (Tobin’s q) and interest rate charged
by financial intermediaries respectively. Het is the houses owned by entrepreneurs at
time t. It denotes investment. And the capital dynamics is described by
3
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (4.12)
where δ is the depreciation ratio.
Bt+1 denotes the borrowing from financial intermediaries. The borrowing amount
is limited to a fraction of the market value of the collateral assets (capital and houses)
Bt+1 ≤ θtEt
[
qt+1Kt+1 + P
h
t+1H
e
t+1
] 1
Ret+1
(4.13)
where θt is the optimal loan-to-value ratio determined by financial intermediaries at
the beginning of each time t. This equation is a Kiyotaki-Moore style credit constraint
equation with an endogenous loan-to-value ratio.
A representative entrepreneur chooses Cet , Lt, It H
e
t+1 and Kt+1 to maximize (4.10)
subject to (4.8), (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13).
The first order conditions for labor demand, capital stock and houses are respec-
tively
Wt = (1− α) Yt
Lt
(4.14)
1
Cet
[
qt − θtEtqt+1 1
Ret+1
]
= γEt
1
Cet+1
[
qt+1 (1− δ − θt) + α (1− η) Yt+1
Kt+1
]
(4.15)
1
Cet
[
P ht − θtEtP ht+1
1
Ret+1
]
= γEt
1
Cet+1
[
P ht+1 (1− θt) + αη
Yt+1
Het+1
]
(4.16)
Equation (4.14) is the standard labor demand equation. Equations (4.15) and (4.16)
are the two Euler equations with respect to Kt and H
e
t . The economic meaning of these
two equations will be discussed later in the simulation section.
3Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), to keep the aggregate numbers of entrepreneurs
constant, the same amount of new entrepreneurs are born to substitute those bankrupt entrepreneurs,
and they are endowed with the same capital stock with other survived entrepreneurs. This assumption
simplifies the computation.
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To ensure that the financial accelerator mechanism is working, we need to make an
extra assumption:
γ +
(
1
Re
− γ
)
θ > 0 (4.17)
The assumption above makes sure that the shadow price of houses is positive at the
steady state. This ensures that the financial accelerator is working when faces small
productivity shocks.
To ensure that the endogenous LTV ratio mechanism is working, it is assumed that:
(
1
Re
− γ
)
θ > 0 (4.18)
The assumption above makes sure that the shadow price of houses is increasing in
the endogenous LTV ratio θt. This guarantees the endogenous LTV ratio mechanism
is working around the steady state. The above two assumptions are easy to satisfy for
most calibrations. We will discusses the mechanism in detail in the simulation section.
Finally, by definition, the return to capital Rkt+1 is
4
Rkt+1 = Et
[
αη Yt+1Kt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1
qt
]
(4.19)
which says that the return to capital is the marginal product of capital plus the capital
gains.
4.2.3 Capital Producers
Entrepreneurs own the technology to produce capital goods as well. They conduct
the production of capital goods through capital producers. Following Christensen and
Dib (2008), capital producers adopt a linear technology to transfer a fraction of con-
sumption goods to capital goods subject to a quadratic adjustment cost specified as
χ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt.
4This equation can be derived strictly using the approach by Luk and Vines (2011). Assume that
entrepreneurs do not conduct the production by themselves. Instead, they rent out their capital to
firms by charging Rkt+1 as unit rent. Then the firms’ problem is to maximize their expected profits:
max
Kt+1,Lt+1
{
Yt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1Kt+1 −WtLt −Rkt+1Kt
}
The first order condition with respect to Kt+1 yields equation (4.19).
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Capital producers’ problem is to maximize their profit by choosing the quantity of
investment It:
max
It
Et
[
qtIt − It − χ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt
]
(4.20)
The first order condition with respect to It is
Et
[
qt − 1− χ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)]
= 0 (4.21)
This equation is a standard Tobin’s Q equation that relates the price of capital to
its marginal adjustment cost. Since in steady state, I¯ = δK¯, the steady state value of qt
is 1. The technology to produce capital is constant return-to-scale, therefore producer’s
profit is zero.
4.2.4 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are owned by households. A representative Financial inter-
mediary collects the savings Dt+1 from households, then lends the savings to en-
trepreneurs. To describe the behavior of financial intermediaries, we need to first define
the bankruptcy (default) probability function of entrepreneurs.
At the end of each period t+ 1, both individual and aggregate shocks are realized.
Entrepreneurs sell their products and use this liquidity income to pay for the wage
bill to workers, and use the left over to pay back the loans plus interests to financial
intermediaries. There is a threshold level ωt+1 such that the left over is just enough to
pay for the loans plus the interests. define this threshold level ωt+1 as ω¯t+1, it should
satisfy:
ω¯t+1Yt+1 −Wt+1Lt+1 −Ret+1Bt+1 = 0 (4.22)
The above equation says that the income for the specific entrepreneur ω¯t+1 is just
enough to pay for the wage bill and due loan plus interest.
Since the distribution function of ωt+1 is fixed and common knowledge, then define
Γ (ω¯t+1) =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1dF (ωt+1) (4.23)
68
4.2 The Model
as the bankruptcy (default) probability function of entrepreneurs. If ωt+1 ≥ ω¯t+1, the
entrepreneurs survive, financial intermediaries will make new loans to them for next
period. If ωt+1 < ω¯t+1, these entrepreneurs are claimed as bankrupt. The banks have
to auction their asset (capital) to get some money back. Assume the bankruptcy cost is
(1− µ), i.e., after the auction, banks can only get µ fraction of the asset market value.
Then the banks’s problem at the beginning of time t is to set an optimal loan-to-value
ratio θt to maximize the expected return
max
θt
Et
 [1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1
Bt+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
θtEt
[(
qt+1Kt+1 + P
h
t+1H
e
t+1
) 1
Ret+1
]
+µΓ (ω¯t+1)Et
[
qt+1 (1− δ)Kt+1 + P ht+1Het+1
]
 (4.24)
where θtEt
[(
qt+1Kt+1 + P
h
t+1H
e
t+1
)
1
Ret+1
]
= Bt+1 is the amount loaned to entrepreneurs.
[1− Γ (ω¯t+1)] is the fraction of loan that is safe. Therefore [1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1Bt+1is
the return from safe loan. Γ (ω¯t+1) is the fraction of entrepreneurs that defaults,
Et
[
qt+1 (1− δ)Kt+1 + P ht+1Het+1
]
is the market value of collateralized assets at time t+
1, and µ is the fraction that can be collected back after the auction. So µΓ (ω¯t+1)Et
[
qt+1 (1− δ)Kt+1 + P ht+1Het+1
]
is the return from bankrupt entrepreneurs.
The optimal behavior of financial intermediaries yielding a first order condition for
θt
θt =
1− Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
+ µ (1− δ) (4.25)
Finally, it is supposed that financial intermediaries are in a complete competitive
market thus face zero-profit constraint, i.e.,
[1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1Bt+1 + µΓ (ω¯t+1)Et
[
(1− δ) qt+1Kt+1 + phtHet+1
]
= Rt+1Dt+1
(4.26)
4.2.5 Properties of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt
We first examine the properties of the default probability function Γ (ω¯t+1) and the
optimal LTV ratio function θt before conducting the simulations. From equation
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(4.22), and apply the property of constant return-to-scale production function that
Wt+1Lt+1 = (1− α)Yt+1, we have
ω¯t+1 = (1− α) +
(
Ret+1 − 1
)
Bt+1
Yt+1
(4.27)
From the last subsection, we have the explicit function expressions of Γ (ω¯t+1) and
θt:
Γ (ω¯t+1) =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1dF (ωt+1) (4.28)
θt =
1− Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂Γ (ω¯t+1)
∂θt
+ µ (1− δ) (4.29)
The above three equations show that the two functions Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt are implicit
functions of Yt+1, Bt+1 and R
e
t+1. As in the last chapter, using the partial equilibrium
trick, we can determine the qualitative relationships between Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt with Yt+1,
Bt+1 and R
e
t+1. Then for convenience, we define
Γ (ω¯t+1) = ψ
( −
Yt+1,
+
Bt+1,
+
Ret+1
)
(4.30)
θt = φ
(
+
Yt+1,
−
Bt+1,
−
Ret+1
)
(4.31)
The signs above the variables stand for the qualitative relationship with θt or
Γ (ω¯t+1) respectively. Then in the next section, the two implicit functions are log-
linearized around the steady state as the only thing matters in a linear system is the
first order derivatives.
4.2.6 Market Clearing Conditions and Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, the markets for goods, labor, houses and loanable fund
all clear. The goods market clearing condition is:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + qtIt (4.32)
The housing market clearing condition is:
H¯ = Hct +H
e
t (4.33)
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where H¯ is the fixed supply of houses.
The market clearing condition for loanable fund market is:
Bt+1 = Dt+1 (4.34)
A competitive equilibrium then can be defined as sequences of prices
{
Wt, qt, P
h
t , Rt, R
e
t
}∞
t=0
and sequences of allocations {Yt, Ct, Cet , It, Lt, θt,Γ (ω¯t) , Dt, Bt,Kt, Hct , Het }∞t=0 such that
(i) taking prices as given, the allocations solve the optimizing problems for households,
entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries and (ii) all markets clear. A full characteri-
zation of the equilibrium is presented in Appendix A.
Appendix B describes the steady state. Let hatted variables denote percentage de-
viations from the steady state, and those without subscript time index denote steady
state values. The model can be reduced to a log-linearized system described in Ap-
pendix C and D.
4.3 Model Simulations
In this section, the results of some numerical experiments are presented. To compare,
a benchmark model is developed. This benchmark model shuts down the optimal loan-
to-value ratio channel. Instead of optimally determining a loan-to-value ratio, financial
intermediaries in the benchmark model fix the loan-to-value ratio to its steady state
value.5 For convenience, in the following parts, the model developed in the last section
is referred to as the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model (endo. LTV in short), the
benchmark model is referred to as the exogenous loan-to-value ratio model (exo. LTV
in short). The simulation results show that a model with endogenous loan-to-value ratio
can generate much larger and more persistence impulse response to productivity shocks.
The first and second order moments generated by the two models are also presented
and compared to the US data. In general, the endogenous loan-to-value ratio model
fits the data better than the benchmark model. Especially, housing price movements
is much more volatile in the endogenous loan-to-value model. This again suggests that
the endogenous LTV ratio mechanism is capable to increase the explanation power of
flexible price models on volatile asset price behaviors.
5Mathematically, in the benchmark model, equation (4.31) is taken away, and θt equals to its steady
state value θ in all equations characterize the competitive equilibrium.
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4.3.1 Model Parameterizations
Table 1 presents the parameter values. Consistent with standard real business cycle
models, the values of (1 − α), δ and ρz are set as (or around) 0.67, 0.025 and 0.95
respectively. Consistent with the estimation of Iacoviello (2005), the values for αη and
α (1− η) are set as 0.3 and 0.03 respectively. The discounting factor of households β
is calibrated such that the quarterly risk free interest rate equals to 1.01%. Consistent
with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), the discounting factor of en-
trepreneurs γ = 0.96. The marginal adjust cost χ is estimated by Christensen and Dib
(2008) as 0.58. The parameter ξl for leisure (1− Lt) is calibrated such that the steady
state of labor is 1/3. Consistent with Iacoviello (2005), the value of ξh is calibrated
such that the housing-output ratio
(
P hH¯
)
/Y is 6.6. The steady state bankruptcy
rate of Γ (ω¯t) is set as 0.05, which is the long-run average bankruptcy rate in US. The
bankruptcy cost (1− µ) is calibrated such that the steady state value of the quarterly
risky interest rate Re equals to 1.03, which is the long-run average risky interest rate
in US. Consistent with chapter 2, the steady state value of the loan-to-value ratio θ is
set as 0.3.
parameter notation value
household’s discount factor β 0.99
entrepreneur’s discount factor γ 0.8
depreciation ratio δ 0.025
total labor income share 1− α 0.67
total capital income share α (1− η) 0.3
total housing income share αη 0.03
marginal adjustment cost χ 0.58
parameter for leisure ξ 0.7698
parameter for housing service ξH 0.1
steady state LTV ratio θ 0.94
bankruptcy cost 1− µ 0.27
persistence of shock ρz 0.95
Slope of Γ (ω¯)
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
0.0005
Table 1. Parameter Values
The value of the first order derivative of the distribution function of Γ (ωt) with
respect to ωt taking value at the steady state
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
is set as 0.0005 in the first
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place. As shown in appendix D, the value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
together with steady state
values of θ, Y , K, B and Re determines the values of Gy, Gb, Gr and Ty, Tb, Tr, the
log-linearized parameters of the two key equations (4.30) and (4.31). And the higher
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
, the higher absolute values of Gy, Gb and Gr. The value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
is set very low so that the values for parameters Gy, Gb and Gr are reasonable in the
sense that they are neither too large nor too small. The values of Gy, Gb, Gr and Ty,
Tb, Tr are reported in appendix E.
In appendix E, sensitivity analysis is conducted with respect to different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
. It shows that as long as the value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
is quite low, the
simulation results are qualitatively robust.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that with the calibrations above, the two assumptions
about the shadow price of houses (equations (4.17) and (4.18)) are satisfied.
4.3.2 Simulation Results
Table 2 presents the standard deviations relative to output for the date and the two
models. All two models tend to over-predict the volatility of consumption Ct but under-
predict the volatilities of other variables, though in general, the model with endogenous
LTV ratio matches the data slightly better. Especially, the endogenous LTV ratio model
produces much higher volatilities in asset prices (Tobin’s q qt and housing price P
h
t )
than the exogenous LTV ratio model.
data Endo. LTV (% of data) Exo. LTV (% of data)
consumption 0.45 123 144
investment, I 1.86 82 65
Labor, L 0.53 49 54
Tobin’s q 6.94 17 9
housing price, P h 1.28 84 60
Table 2. Percentage standard deviation relative to output
Note: here consumption = C + Ce. This definition applies to all the tables in this
section.
Table 3 presents the contemporaneous correlations between main variables for the
data and the two models. The two models over-predicts all correlations, though the
endogenous LTV ratio model matches the data slightly better.
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data Endo. LTV (% of data) Exo. LTV (% of data)
(Y, C) 0.95 104 109
(Y, I) 0.96 102 107
(Y, B) 0.67 185 190
(B, q) 0.54 146 157
(B, P h) 0.58 153 165
Table 3, Contemporaneous correlation
In terms of first-order autocorrelations, as one can see from Table 4, in general,
the two models over-predict the autocorrelations of all main variables. However, the
endogenous LTV ratio model performs slightly better than the exogenous LTV ratio
model.
data Endo. LTV (% of data) Exo. LTV (% of data)
output, Y 0.98 102 108
consumption, C 0.90 105 114
investment, I 0.96 107 116
bank loan, B 0.92 103 109
Tobin’s q 0.89 103 107
housing price, P h 0.83 108 118
Table 4. First-order autocorrelations
To summarize, the credit constraint models tend to over-predict the first and second
order moments of variables except for the volatility of asset prices. However, the credit
constraint model with endogenous LTV ratio fits the data slightly better in general. In
particular, the endogenous LTV ratio model can produce much more volatile asset prices
(qt and P
h
t in this chapter) movements. This is an significant improvement considering
that the standard real business cycles are notorious for producing low volatility of asset
prices.
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Figure 1. impulse response to a 1% positive real shock
Figures 1 - 4 are impulse responses of main variables in response to a 1% positive
productivity shock. For both models, the bankruptcy rate Γ (ω¯t) (top right on figure
2) decreases immediately after the shock. To exploit this opportunity and earn more
expected returns, banks in the endogenous LTV ratio model increase the LTV ratio θt
(bottom right on figure 1). By assumption, there is no change of θt in the exogenous
LTV ratio model. Compared to the exogenous LTV ratio model, the increase of θt
in the endogenous LTV ratio model leads to a higher production Yt, a much higher
capital accumulation Kt, and a higher consumption Ct by relaxing the credit constraint
(Bt+1 ≤ θtEt
[
qt+1Kt+1 + P
h
t+1H
e
t+1
]
1
Ret+1
) further, which spurs a much larger bank
loans to entrepreneurs.
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Figure 2. impulse response to a 1% positive TFP shock
There are a few interesting features reflected in these figures. In figure 2, the
bankruptcy probability Γ (ω¯t) decreases more in the exogenous LTV ratio model than
in the endogenous LTV ratio model. This reflects the fact that in the endogenous LTV
ratio model, banks exploit the new investment opportunity and increase their loan to
entrepreneurs for more expected returns. This puts more stakes at risks and tends to
increase the bankruptcy rate, as stated in equation (??). Entrepreneurs invest more
on capital with more bank loans, which reduces the return to capital Rkt because of
diminishing marginal return to capital, as shown on the top left on figure 2. It can be
interpreted that by allowing banks optimally setting a loan-to-value ratio, the economy
operates more efficient in the sense that no opportunity is wasted. In an economy with
endogenous LTV ratio, the capital accumulation as well as production increased much
larger than in the exogenous LTV ratio model.
In addition, more bank loans in the endogenous LTV ratio model also leads to a
higher risk premium (Ret − Rt), as shown in the bottom right on figure 2. This is
consistent with the data as well as intuition. In a world of uncertainty, more lending
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puts more money at risk (a higher bankruptcy chances), which require a higher risk
premium to compensate the extra risks.
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Figure 3. impulse response to a 1% positive TFP shock
Figure 3 presents the impulse responses of asset prices, Tobin’s Q qt and housing
price P ht . The endogenous LTV ratio model produces larger responses in asset prices
than the exogenous LTV model. With an endogenous LTV ratio, the credit constraint
is relaxed further, which leads to higher borrowing (Bt) from the banks, as shown on
bottom left of figure 2. With more fund available, entrepreneurs can invest more on
capital stock and buy more houses to produce. Higher demand pushes up the prices
higher.
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Figure 4. impulse response to a 1% positive TFP shock
Figure 4 presents the responses of house holdings of households and entrepreneurs.
Since for credit constrained entrepreneurs, houses are qualified as collateral, they
have extra values for entrepreneurs. When more investment opportunity appears, en-
trepreneurs are more desired to acquire houses than households. Since the supply of
houses is fixed, house holdings of entrepreneurs in both models increase accompanying
an equivalent decrease in the house holdings of households, as shown in figure 4. With
an endogenous LTV ratio which increases during a boom, the “collateral premium”
described above is even larger. This explains why house holdings of entrepreneurs
(households) increase (decrease) more in the endogenous LTV ratio model. This mech-
anism can be explained more clearly with the Euler equation with respect to Het+1:
pht = Et
{
γ
Cet
Cet+1
[
αη
Yt+1
Het+1
]
+ µtp
h
t+1
}
(4.35)
where µt = γ
Cet
Cet+1
(1− θt) + θt 1Ret+1 is the shadow price of credit constraint. Notice
this equation is just another form of equation (4.16). This Euler equation indicates
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that, the marginal cost to acquire one unit of houses pht equals to its marginal product
plus the collateral premium: µtp
h
t+1. Since with our calibrations, the assumptions that
γ +
(
1
Re − γ
)
θ > 0 and
(
1
Re − γ
)
> 0 (equations (4.17) and (4.18)) are both satisfied,
therefore the shadow price µtp
h
t+1 is positive around the steady state, and a larger θt
causes a higher collateral premium. As a result, in the endogenous LTV ratio model,
entrepreneurs hold more houses than in the exogenous LTV ratio model when they are
facing productivity shocks.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter extends the model of the last chapter to include one more collateral asset:
the real estate. The aim is to study the effects of an endogenous loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio on the behaviors of housing price in a real dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with houses as collateral assets.
The simulation results show that compared with a constant LTV ratio model, the en-
dogenous LTV ratio model produces more significant and persistent impulse responses
of all main variables to TFP shocks. The first and second moments of the endogenous
LTV ratio model fit the data slightly better than the exogenous LTV ratio model. More
importantly, asset prices, including both Tobin’s Q and the housing price, are much
more volatile in the endogenous LTV ratio model. This shows that the endogenous
LTV ratio improves the ability of flexible price models in explaining volatile asset price
movements.
The results suggest that the endogenous loan-to-value ratio acts like an accelerator
to the financial accelerator incurred by credit constraints and a constant loan-to-value
ratio model might underestimates the amplifying effects of credit constraints. Consid-
ering the facts that mortgage loans accounts for more than 1/3 of the banking assets
and the loan-to-value ratio (1 - down-payment ratio) is pro-cyclical, the endogenous
loan-to-value ratio model has the potential to better explain the behaviors of housing
prices.
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4.5 Appendix A: Characterization of Equilibrium
labor supply equation:
ξ
1− Lt = Wt
1
Ct
(4.1)
Euler equation with respect to Dt+1:
1
Ct
= βEt
[
1
Ct+1
Rt+1
]
(4.2)
Euler equation with respect to Hct+1:
1
Ct
pht = βEt
[
1
Ct+1
pht+1 + ξh
1
Hct+1
]
(4.3)
labor demand equation:
Wt = (1− α) Yt
Lt
(4.4)
Euler equation with respect to Kt+1:
1
Cet
[
qt − θtEtqt+1 1
Ret+1
]
= γEt
1
Cet+1
[
qt+1 (1− δ − θt) + α (1− φ) Yt+1
Kt+1
]
(4.5)
Euler equation with respect to Het+1:
1
Cet
[
pht − θtEtpht+1
1
Ret+1
]
= γEt
1
Cet+1
[
pht+1 (1− θt) + αφ
Yt+1
Het+1
]
(4.6)
return to capital:
Rkt =
α YtKt + (1− δ) qt
qt−1
(4.7)
Tobin’s Q:
qt = 1 + χ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(4.8)
Zero-Profit Condition:
[1− Γ (ω¯t+1)]Ret+1Bt+1 +µΓ (ω¯t+1)Et
[
(1− δ) qt+1Kt+1 + phtHet+1
]
= Rt+1Dt+1 (4.9)
optimal loan-to-value ratio:
θt = φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
(4.10)
bankruptcy probability function:
Γ (ω¯t+1) = ψ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
(4.11)
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credit market clear condition:
Bt = Dt (4.12)
production function:
Yt = zt
[
(Het )
φK1−φt
]α
L1−αt (4.13)
consumption goods market clear condition:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + qtIt (4.14)
housing market clear condition:
H = Hct +H
e
t (4.15)
credit constraint:
Bt+1 = θtEt
[
qt+1Kt+1 + p
h
t+1H
e
t+1
] 1
Ret+1
(4.16)
budget constraint for households:
WtLt + p
h
tH
c
t +RtDt = p
h
tH
c
t+1 + Ct +Dt+1 (4.17)
evolution of capital:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (4.18)
Exogenous Shock:
ln (zt+1) = ρz ln (zt) + ε
z
t+1 (4.19)
4.6 Appendix B: Steady State
P hHc = β
[
P hHc + ξhC
]
(4.1)
1− θ 1
Re
= γ
[
1− δ − θ + α (1− φ) Y
K
]
(4.2)
P h
(
1− θ 1
Re
)
= γ
[
P h (1− θ) + αφ Y
He
]
(4.3)
Rk = α (1− φ) Y
K
+ 1− δ (4.4)
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Y =
(
K1−φ (He)φ
)α
L1−α (4.5)
B = θ
[(
P hHe +K
) 1
Re
]
(4.6)
B = D (4.7)
[1− Γ (ω¯)]ReB + µΓ (ω¯) (1− δ)K = RD (4.8)
Γ (ω¯) =
∫ ∞
0
ω¯dF (ω¯) (4.9)
ω¯ = (1− α) + R
eB
Y
(4.10)
θ =
1− Γ (ω¯)
∂Γ (ω¯)
∂ω¯
+ µ (1− δ) (4.11)
W = (1− α) Y
L
(4.12)
[1− Γ (ω¯)]ReB + µΓ (ω¯)
[
(1− δ)K + P hHe
]
= RD (4.13)
WL+DR = C +D (4.14)
4.7 Appendix C: Log-linearized System
L
1− Llˆt = −cˆt + wˆt (4.1)
−cˆt = Et [−cˆt+1 + rˆt+1] (4.2)
P h
C
(
pˆht − cˆt
)
= βEt
[
P h
C
(
pˆht+1 − cˆt+1
)
− ξh
Hc
Hˆct+1
]
(4.3)
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yˆt = wˆt + lˆt (4.4)(
θ
1
Re
− 1
)
cˆet + qˆt − θ
1
Re
(
θˆt + qˆt+1 − rˆet+1
)
= (4.5)(
θ
1
Re
− 1
)
cˆet+1 + γ
[
α (1− φ) Y
K
(
yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
)
+ (1− δ − θ) qˆt+1 − θθˆt
]
(4.6)
(
θP h
1
Re
− 1
)
cˆet + P
hpˆht − θP h
1
Re
(
θˆt + pˆ
h
t+1 − rˆet+1
)
=
(
θP h
1
Re
− 1
)
cˆet+1 + γ
[
P h (1− θ) pˆht+1 + αφ
Y
He
(
yˆt+1 − hˆet+1
)
− P hθθˆt
]
Rkrˆkt = α
Y
K
(
yˆt − kˆt
)
+ (1− δ) qˆt −Rkqˆt−1 (4.7)
qˆt = χ
(
iˆt − kˆt
)
(4.8)
−Γ (ω¯)ReBΓˆ (ω¯t+1) + [1− Γ (ω¯)]ReB
(
ret+1 + bˆt+1
)
(4.9)
+µΓ (ω¯)
[
(1− δ)K + P hHe
]
Γˆ (ω¯t+1)
+µΓ (ω¯)
[
(1− δ)K
[
qˆt+1 + kˆt+1
]
+ P hHe
(
pˆht+1 + hˆ
e
t+1
)]
= RD
(
rˆt+1 + dˆt+1
)
θˆt = Tyyˆt+1 + Tbbˆt+1 + Trrˆ
e
t+1 (4.10)
Γˆ (ω¯t) = Gyyˆt +Gbbˆt +Grrˆ
e
t (4.11)
yˆt = zˆt + αkˆt + (1− α) lˆt (4.12)
yˆt = zˆt + αkˆt + (1− α) lˆt (4.13)
yˆt =
C
Y
cˆt +
Ce
Y
cˆet +
I
Y
iˆt (4.14)
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Bbˆt+1 = θ
(
K + P hHe
) 1
Re
(
θˆt − rˆet+1
)
(4.15)
+θ
1
Re
[
K
(
qˆt+1 + kˆt+1
)
+ P hHe
(
pˆht+1 + hˆ
e
t+1
)]
(4.16)
bˆt+1 = dˆt+1 (4.17)
WL
(
wˆt + lˆt
)
+RD
(
rˆt + dˆt
)
= Ccˆt +Ddˆt+1 (4.18)
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + δiˆt (4.19)
zˆt+1 = ρz zˆt + ε
z
t+1 (4.20)
4.8 Appendix D: log-linearization of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt
From section 3.3, we know that, Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt are implicit functions of Yt+1, Bt+1,
and Ret+1. (Equations (4.31) and (4.30) in the text.):
Γ (ω¯t) = ψ
(−
Yt,
+
Bt,
+
Ret
)
(4.21)
θt = φ
(
+
Yt+1,
−
Bt+1,
−
Ret+1
)
(4.22)
We take Taylor’s first-order extensions on the implicit functions of Γ (ω¯t) = ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
and θt = φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
with respect to Yt, Bt and R
e
t at the steady state, then
use the log-linearization approximation formula, we have:
Γˆ (ω¯t) = Gyyˆt +Gbbˆt +Grrˆ
e
t (4.23)
θˆt = Tyyˆt+1 + Tbbˆt+1 + Trrˆ
e
t+1 (4.24)
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where
Gy =
1
ψ (Yt, Bt, Ret )
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
=
1
ψ (Yt, Bt, Ret )
(
−∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
RetBt
Y 2t
)∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
= − 1
Γ (ω¯)
ReB
Y 2
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
The second step uses the result from section 3.3: equation (3.27). Similarly, we can get
the values for the other five parameters using the properties of Γ (ω¯t+1) and θt from
the section 3.3:
Gb =
1
Γ (ω¯)
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Bt
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
(4.25)
=
1
Γ (ω¯)
Re
Y
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
Gr =
1
Γ (ω¯)
∂ψ (Yt, Bt, R
e
t )
∂Ret
∣∣∣∣
Yt=Y,Bt=B,Ret=R
(4.26)
=
1
Γ (ω¯)
B
Y
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
Ty =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(4.27)
=
1
θ
ReB
Y (K + P hHe)
Tb =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(4.28)
= −1
θ
Re
K + P hHe
Tr =
1
θ
∂φ
(
Yt+1, Bt+1, R
e
t+1
)
∂Yt
∣∣∣∣∣
Yt+1=Y,Bt+1=B,Ret+1=R
(4.29)
= −1
θ
B
K + P hHe
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And it is clearly from the formulas above that the values of these six parameters
depend on the steady state values of Γ (ω¯t+1), θt, Yt, Bt, Kt, P
hHe and Ret (whose
values are listed in appendix B) as well as
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
4.9 Appendix E: Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix reports the sensitivity analysis for the six parameters in these two equa-
tions:
Γˆ (ω¯t) = Gyyˆt +Gbbˆt +Grrˆ
e
t (4.30)
θˆt = Tyyˆt+1 + Tbbˆt+1 + Trrˆ
e
t+1 (4.31)
Table 1 reports the values ofGy, Gb, Gr and Ty, Tb, Tr for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
It is clear from this table that the higher value of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
, the larger the gap be-
tween Gy and Gb, Gr as well as Ty and Tb, Tr.
∂Γ (ω¯)
∂ω¯
Gy Gb Gr Ty Tb Tr
0.0001 -0.8485 0.0027 0.8238 1.2877 -0.0031 -0.9204
0.0005 -2.6501 0.0138 2.5729 1.3422 -0.0052 -0.9204
0.0007 -3.6741 0.0194 3.5671 1.3424 -0.0053 -0.9204
Table E1:
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
and the six parameters
Figure E1 reports the impulse response of θt and Yt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
The first row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.0005, the second row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.007.
The results of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.005 are reported in the main text.
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Figure E1. impulse response of YT and θt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
Figure E2 presents the impulse response of Γt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
.
The first row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.0005, the second row is for
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.007.
The results of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
= 0.005 are reported in the main text.
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Figure E2. impulse response of Γt for different values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
The sensitivity analysis shows that, first, the qualitative relationship is robust to
the values of
∂Γ (ω¯t)
∂ω¯t
∣∣∣∣
ω¯t=ω¯
as long as it is quite low.
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5Conclusion
This thesis attempts to improve the ability of flexible price models to produce higher
asset price volatilities by introducing frictions in the money and credit markets.
The second chapter integrates a segmented money market with a credit constraint
into a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model to explain the volatile fluctuations
of asset prices in a stable macroeconomic environment. The integrated model, though
sticks to the flexible price assumption, is capable to produce similar impulse responses
to monetary shocks with sticky price models in the sense that in response to positive
monetary shocks, production and asset prices increase dramatically. In addition, the
simulations show that the integrated model matches the data better in general than a
standard cash-in-advance model or a model with only credit constraint or segmented
money market. In particular, the integrated model produces much larger asset price
volatilities, a fact explained poorly by standard real business models.
The third chapter develops a real dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with a credit constraint of which the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is endogenized.
Banks are allowed to optimally determine the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. A positive
productivity shock motivates banks to increase the optimal LTV ratio. The endogenous
LTV ratio functions as the accelerator of the financial accelerator incurred by credit
constraints. Compared with a constant LTV ratio model, the endogenous LTV ratio
model produces much more significant and persistent impulse responses to productivity
shocks. Asset price movements are much more volatile in the endogenous LTV ratio
model as well, which is an improvement to match the data.
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5. CONCLUSION
The fourth chapter expands the models developed in chapter 3 to include houses as
collateral and studies the impacts of endogenous LTV ratio on housing price behaviors
in a real dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The simulations show that the
endogenous LTV ratio can produce much larger volatilities in housing prices as well,
therefore improve the ability of flexible price models in explaining volatile housing price
movements.
A future research direction would be to combine segmented market, credit constraint
with an endogenous loan-to-value ratio into one model to see whether this combination
could produce even larger volatilities in asset prices.
After the global financial crisis, the interests of economists in developing a DSGE
model with a serious (that is, micro-founded) financial sector have been surging. The
financial sector in chapter 2 is just a tool to introduce financial frictions. The financial
sectors in chapter 3 & 4 are more rigorous and can be seen as belonging to the new
strand of literature on micro-founded financial sectors. However, the financial sectors
in chapter 3 & 4 are still too simple and more micro-foundations are still needed. This
would be on my future research agenda.
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